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Deep Cuts: Four Critiques of Legal
Ideology
Justin Desautels-Stein & Akbar Rasulov
This Article begins an effort to rekindle the intellectual tradition of
critical legal theory. The context for the project is significant. On the one
hand is the grip of a social crisis, the contours of which continue to
confound the commentariat. Racism, xenophobia, gendered violence,
migration and nation, climate change, health pandemics, political
corruption. The parade is as intimidating as it is spectacular. On the other
hand, the very tools of criticism we depend upon in identifying these
characters in the parade, much less the spectacle of the parade itself, are
themselves in crisis. There is, in a word, a crisis for critique itself. The
working assumption of this Article is that these crises—crises in society and
the crises of critique—are not unrelated. It is in this context that we believe
in the need to revitalize the tools of critical legal studies, an intellectual
songbook from the 1970s that deserves a 21st century reboot.
The argument is as follows. Among the crises of our time is the sense that
law is either too marginal or too political to be of any use in the work for
social justice—social justice rendered in any one of the crises mentioned
above. We all know only too well, according to this sensibility, how to
criticize judges, lawyers, and the academic elite. And these criticisms, of
which everyone so easily partakes, all seem to bottom out in the same thing:
law is either corrupt or ineffective. This Article suggests that this defeatist
sensibility, and its affiliation with a popularized notion of legal criticism, is
itself a legal ideology. Strangely enough, this ideology of defeat is the result
of decades worth of ideology-critique that have now calcified into a block
on our ability to see beyond them. That is, over the course of the twentieth
century there emerged four traditions for criticizing the ideology of law,
and today, these four traditions exhaust our collective abilities to formulate
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novel critical approaches. This Article names and evaluates these four
critiques of legal ideology, but not with an eye toward rehabilitation.
Rather, it is our hope that in making explicit our traditions of ideology-
critique in law, we put ourselves in a better position for the next step: to
imagine what the critique of legal ideology might yet become.
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INTRODUCTION
In these first decades of the Twenty-First century, crisis is the new
normal: crises of community brought on by the continuing resurgence of
racism, sexism, and xenophobia; environmental crises brought on by global
climate change; global health and food crises brought on by the profound
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distributional imbalances, dislocations, and vulnerabilities created by the
capitalist Anthropocene; political crises of rising authoritarianism abroad
combined with the deep polarization and loss of faith in the traditional
democratic institutions at home; social crises re-emerging from the legacies
of slavery, colonization, imperialism, patriarchy, and heteronormativity;
educational crises borne out of the ever-deepening commodification of
learning; financial crises borne out of the structural inadequacies of
institutional oversight and regulatory procedures; employment crises
resulting from system-wide disparities of wealth, equality, and opportunity;
constitutional crises wrought by the rise of political opportunism and the
erosion of the rule of law; crises of meaning in the ascendance of the so-
called “thought leader”; crises of civic culture, public discourse, and “post-
truth” sensibilities; crises of civic thought, public intellectualism, and the
devaluation of the humanities.1
If we are uncertain about the causes of these crises, or the accelerants of
their proliferation, what is clear is their urgency. Everywhere it seems what
was recently solid is melting, both literally and figuratively.2 In many ways,
if the present is unnerving, the future is downright ominous.3
In the midst of these crises, multiple questions arise: What stymies our
collective efforts? What arrests our imaginative potential for social change?
Is it enough to wear a Black Lives Matter t-shirt, join a Facebook group, or
plant a sign about equality in your front yard? If crisis is everywhere, what
might account for this prevalent sense of malaise, exhaustion, and
immobilization, of impotence in the face of a world run riot? In the
hinterlands of the internet everyone seems to find a license to criticize. In
the low stakes of social media discourse, users enjoy this license to voice
their views, to slash and burn, to “trigger” and “troll,” show truth to power.
On the face of it, are these demotic riches really a good thing? Or is it,
ultimately, unhelpful distraction? There is no denying that this ongoing
explosion of new discourses—new voices, new viewpoints, new
perspectives—has drummed up a background hum of false equivalences.
There is also no denying that, for so many of us, media saturation leads to
paralysis of judgment, or the curious reverse, judgement without any
reflection at all. All out criticism via an absence of thought. Either we
cannot decide, or we have already decided.4
1. See generally, Elizabeth Anker & Justin Desautels-Stein, Introduction to the Symposium: The Stakes
for Critical Legal Theory, 92 U. COLO. L. REV. _ (2021); PIERRE SCHLAG, AMERICAN ABSURD: A
WORK OF FICTION (2016); Akbar Rasulov, Introduction: The Discipline of International Economic Law
at a Crossroads, in NEW VOICES AND NEW PERSPECTIVES IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 1, 2-6
(John Haskell & Akbar Rasulov eds. 2020).
2. With the added layer of climate change, the reference is to Marshall Berman’s classic, ALL THAT IS
SOLID MELTS INTO AIR: THE EXPERIENCE OF MODERNITY (1981).
3. Or maybe this is just another trope. See COREY ROBIN, FEAR: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL IDEA
(2006).
4. See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, PETER GORDON, AND MAX PENSKY, THREE INQUIRIES IN CRITICAL
1
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Indeed, this combination of “critical license” with media saturation
churns out a popular skepticism always on the ready to “debunk,” hoping
to “own” some opponent on the field of online sparring. But debunk what,
exactly, and own who? And by what means? As many suspect, this tendency
to wage war under the cover of “criticism” is all too often more illusory than
real. As a cursory tour through the networks of the media’s culture industry
attests, political, cultural, identitarian, and economic polarizations demand
loyalty first and last.5 The debunking, the constant criticizing, the shrillness
of public debate—all of it suggests the wholesale lack of anything
resembling a clear and coherent understanding of what genuine criticism
should be about.6 If information technology freely distributes a license to
critique, and if the polarizing tendencies of racism, sexism, and nationalism
are only raging, it should be clear enough that something has gone wrong.7
The license to critique is making things worse, whereas one would think
that such a license would put everyone on alert about the dubiousness of
truth-claims conveyed in the machineries of social media. And yet, social
media has become the oracle of the age.8
All of this suggests not just a certain sense of doubt about the ultimate
sincerity of intention behind all the different discursive exercises that we
wage in the name of “criticism.” It also raises the possibility that our very
idea of criticism itself no longer matches the reality of its practice.9 When
information technology freely distributes the license to critique, but racism,
sexism, and nationalism remain on the rise, something is lost in translation.
Our capacity for public discourse has been profoundly revolutionized by
new social media technologies, but the cultural reflexes we depend upon for
their use are lagging behind. Perhaps the root of the problem lies with our
enthusiasm for new communicative technologies. Or, it is the culture of
THEORY (2018); COREY ROBIN, THE REACTIONARY MIND: CONSERVATIVISM FROM EDMUND BURKE
TO DONALD TRUMP (2017).
5. This combination of polarization, demands for loyalty, and the tendency to assume that since
“everything bad” – racism, right-wing populism, fascist authoritarianism, xenophobia, trade
protectionism, climate change denialism, the disregard for human rights – hangs together, the answer to
it should also take a similarly “monolithic” form, seems to be characteristic of the contemporary
historical conjuncture not only in North America but also in Europe. On the shielding effect this
narrative creates and the politics that it enables, see further Rasulov, supra note 1, at 3-6.
6. For one view of the cathedral, see TERRY EAGLETON, AFTER THEORY (2003).
7. On the “crisis of identity,” see, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, SENSES OF THE SUBJECT (2015); KWAME
ANTHONY APPIAH, LINES OF DESCENT: W. E. B. DUBOIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF IDENTITY (2014);
KIMBERLE CRENSHAW, ON INTERSECTIONALITY: ESSENTIAL WRITINGS (2020); ELLA SHOHAT,
UNTHINKING EUROCENTRISM: MULTICULTURALISM AND THE MEDIA (2014); GLEN COULTHARD, RED
SKIN, WHITE MASKS: REJECTING THE COLONIAL POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (2014); SARAH AHMED,
LIVING A FEMINIST LIFE (2017); AUDRA SIMPSON, MOHAWK INTERRUPTUS: POLITICAL LIFE ACROSS
THE BORDERS OF SETTLER STATES (2014).
8. SAFIYA NOBLE, THE INTERSECTION INTERNET: RACE, SEX, AND CULTURE ONLINE (2016); ANDREW
FEENBERG, TECHNOSYSTEM: THE SOCIAL LIFE OF REASON (2017); N. KATHERINE HAYLES, HOW WE
THINK: DIGITAL MEDIA AND CONTEMPORARY TECHNOGENESIS (2012); JODI DEAN, PUBLICITY’S
SECRET: HOW TECHNOCULTURE CAPITALIZES ON DEMOCRACY (2002).
9. See EAGLETON, supra note 6.
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criticism and our enthusiasm for the critical impulse that are making things
worse.
As “unprecedented” as these concerns may feel, a century ago a very
similar feeling of collective unease had caught the world by the throat.
These were the interwar years, a time of collapse and rising terror, and the
moment of what we know today as “critical theory” that emerged in pre-
Nazi Frankfurt, Germany.10 It was also a moment in which a shadow was
casting itself upon a modernizing age of technological, economic, and
artistic efflorescence. Steeped in the relative affluence of the Weimar
Republic, those scholars affiliated with the beginnings of Germany’s
“Frankfurt School” saw the writing on the wall.11 Busily deciphering its
language, querying the odd sense in which the greater culture was unmoved,
and demanding an interrogation of what was passing for “just the ways
things were,” these theorists developed the first rounds of critical theory in
a time of unmistakable “crisis.” Standing on the shoulders of Friedrich
Nietzsche, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud, they studied how the status quo
seemed to freeze in place, disabling an experimentalism of institutional
imagination. Moving from Marx’s groundwork, this first round of critical
theory often took “ideology” as the target. These early thinkers asked, what
do we take for granted in our social, political, economic, and legal
arrangements? What do we assume to be “natural” or “necessary” that in
fact is contingent and might be otherwise? From the start, critical theory
emerged in a crucible of crisis, aiming to shift our appreciations of the
problems in the present—and even what we can see as a problem—so that
we could have better insight both into the crises we face, and toward the
path to transforming our society for the better.
Over time, a concern with ideology emerged in the work of legal theorists
as well, though it wasn’t until the 1970s that the Frankfurt School’s
influence had an effect.12 And it is the story of how the critique of legal
ideology developed and stalled that is the focus of this Article. Our claim is
that the project of reimagining critical legal theory must begin with an
understanding of how the critique of legal ideology has become increasingly
deradicalized. Much of the problem, however, both for the broader spate of
critical theory and for the more narrow terrain of critical legal theory, is that
by the 1970s—just as critical theory and legal theory were making their
introductions—the domestication and popularization of critique was
10. FREDRIC JAMESON, MARXISM AND FORM: TWENTIETH CENTURY DIALECTICAL THEORIES OF
LITERATURE (1974); MARTIN JAY, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION (1996); CATHERINE LIU,
AMERICAN IDYLL: ACADEMIC ANTIELITISM AS CULTURAL CRITIQUE (2011); ANDREW FEENBERG, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF PRAXIS: MARX, LUKACS, AND THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL (2014).
11. See, e.g., MARTIN JAY, SPLINTERS IN YOUR EYE: ESSAYS ON THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL (2020); THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL (Peter Gordon et al., eds. 2018).
12. Among the first of such studies was DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT (1975).
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already well under way.
The interwar years reflected a moment of openness with respect to social
transformation that would close with the coming of the Cold War.13 Of
course, “openness” shouldn’t be confused for “goodness.” After the Great
Depression, and before the New Deal apparatus went mainstream, there was
considerable leeway in the public imagination for how to arrange the
political, economic, and social affairs of both the national and international
systems. The ideological “freeze” on the status quo, we might say, was in
flux. Indeed, the idea of an American socialist movement was hardly the
stuff of science fiction. The Bolshevik revolution of 1917 might not have
been the template for social change in the West, but that was precisely the
question: not whether social change, but what kind?14 That said, this
openness with respect to how political economy might be organized was
partnered with a totalitarian and deeply racist view of immigration and
national community. Here was the rise of eugenics and a racialized right of
sovereigns to exclude foreigners from the border.15
As the Cold War started to take shape, and however meaningful this “up-
for-grabs” sensibility really was, it was overtaken by a new consensus about
political economy, race and xenophobia, and the rule of law.16 This was the
consolidation of an appreciation for heavy governmental regulation mixed
with market competition, a suite of civil rights laws aimed at the elimination
of racial discrimination both at home, at the border, and in international
relations, and a sociological approach to law and legal thought.17 The
13. Sam Moyn’s treatment of Judith Shklar’s place in the political imagination is emblematic of this
narrative. See Samuel Moyn, Before-and Beyond-the Liberalism of Fear, inBETWEEN UTOPIANISM AND
REALISM: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JUDITH SHKLAR (Ashendum and Hess, eds., 2020). See
generally, AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (2014); MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE
DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920 (2003);
DANIEL YERGIN AND JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR THE WORLD
ECONOMY (2002).
14. For some typical illustrations of the tone of the debate during the preceding decades, see, e.g.,
DANIEL DE LEON, SOCIALIST RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIETY: THE INDUSTRIAL VOTE (1905); Thorstein
Veblen, The Socialist Economics of Karl Marx and His Followers, 20 Q. J. ECON. 575 (1906); John R.
Commons, Is Class Conflict in America Growing and Is It Inevitable?, 13 AMER. J. SOC’Y 756 (1908).
For some recent takes on the history of American socialism in the early twentieth century, see also
Elizabeth McKillen, The Socialist Party of America, 1900-1929, OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPAEDIA
ON AMERICAN HISTORY (2017), https://oxfordre.com/americanhistory; Paul Heideman, The Rise and
Fall of the Socialist Party of America, JACOBIN, Feb. 20, 2017, https://jacobinmag.com/2017/02/rise-
and-fall-socialist-party-of-america.
15. See, e.g., KUNAL PARKER, MAKING FOREIGNERS: IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAW IN
AMERICA, 1600-2000 (2015); MAI NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA (2014); ADAM MCKEOWN, MELANCHOLY ORDER: ASIAN MIGRATION AND THE
GLOBALIZATION OF BORDERS (2011).
16. For discussion, see Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski, and Sabeel
Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth Century Synthesis,
129 YALE L. J. 1784 (2020).
17. See JUSTIN DESAUTELS-STEIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF STYLE: A STRUCTURALIST HISTORY OF
AMERICAN PRAGMATISM AND LIBERAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2018); JUSTIN DESAUTELS-STEIN, THE RULE
OF RACIAL IDEOLOGY: INTERNATIONAL LAW, BORDERS, AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE (forthcoming,
2022).
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proponents of this view saw it as a means for closing down the frightening
alternatives of fascism and socialism, and staking a position against the
Soviet Union and for the rest of the world. In Europe, this quest for the
middle way gave rise to a variety of different models and paradigms, from
the German Soziale Marktwirtschaft (social market economy) to the
Franco-Italian Eurocommunism.18 In the North American context, the logic
of this political project came to be seen, more generally, as a form of
“social-democratic compromise.” The essential idea, as Roberto Unger
writes, was to replace revolution with management and reorganization with
redistribution:
The social-democratic compromise implied [the] renunciation . . . of
conflict and controversy. National governments won the power and the
authority to manage the economy countercyclically, to compensate for
the unequalizing effects of economic growth through tax-and-transfer,
and to take those investment initiatives that seemed necessary to satisfy
the requirements for the profitability of private firms. In return,
however, they had to abandon the threat radically to reorganize the
system of production and exchange and thereby reshape the primary
distribution of wealth and income in society.19
The Cold War played a crucial role in stabilizing the capitalist system of
the North Atlantic region and, through that, the broader political and
institutional landscape from which concepts like social democracy and
social market economy derived their cultural significance and momentum.
Once the Cold War ended, the essential dynamics that sustained this implicit
cultural and political equilibrium dissipated. Questions, which for several
generations were closed down, began a process of anthesis. Opinions and
views once dismissed as indefensible and beyond the pale crept back into
the space of the public debate.
Among the first blossoming questions, starting already from the early
1990s, was whether the social-democratic compromise of the postwar era
had outlived its usefulness. The initial response, favored by the political and
cultural elites on both sides of the Atlantic, followed from Anthony
Giddens’ highly influential thesis that came to be known as the Third Way.20
In the US, the new paradigm found its main expression in Bill Clinton’s
“New Democrats.” In the UK, it gave rise to Tony Blair’s “New Labour.”
In Germany, it took the form of Gerhard Schroeder’s “Die Neue Mitte.” The
general pattern was largely the same: sweeping deregulation, a rollback of
the welfare state, promotion of “multicultural citizenship,” liberal
18. For background, see GERMANY’S SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION (Alan
Peacock & Hans Willgerodt eds., 1989); QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE END OF EMPIRE AND
THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERALISM 189-191 (2018); Rick Simon, Eurocommunism, in TWENTIETH-
CENTURY MARXISM: A GLOBAL INTRODUCTION 81-94 (Daryl Glaser & David M. Walker eds., 2007).
19. ROBERTO UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 35 (1996).
20. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (1998).
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egalitarianism, and promotion of judicial review and human rights
formalism.21
A decade later the atmosphere of enthusiasm that accompanied the arrival
of the Third Way had largely dissolved. Some of it had something to do
with 9/11 and the “war on terror” that followed it,22 but in the main, the fact
was that the new socio-political equilibrium promised by the Third Way
camp had never quite materialized. What did materialize—a “hot, flat, and
crowded”23 “world on fire”24 of “golden straitjackets”25 and “new
imperialisms”26—was far less inclusive than the old model of social
democracy it replaced, a realization that became increasingly obvious in the
aftermath of the 2008-09 global economic crisis and the resulting rise of the
politics of anti-elitist mistrust, populism, and polarization.
What came next was unsurprising. Where the foundations of social
consensus are lacking and the institutional forms designed to induce and
sustain it weaken, the climate becomes ripe for nostalgia. The litany of
books and articles launched in the last few years suggests that, at least in
the minds of the cultural, political, and legal commentariat, there seems
little doubt that while the challenges are legion, the answer is always a
return to the “old normal,” i.e., a resurrection of the social-democratic
compromise.27 What underpins this nostalgic narrative is a highly selective
reading of history, and the rapid intensification of tone triggered in the last
few years by the ascendancy of rightwing populist governments across the
North Atlantic region, with the Trump administration at the proverbial
forefront, has only made the cherry-picking all the worse.
Convictions fueling this yearning for a return to “normalcy” are grounded
in an uncritical acceptance about how good the “old normal” really was. But
more, and as Jedidiah Britton-Purdy correctly implies, there is the
assumption that a return to the old norms and the socio-political
consensuses they captured is not only historically possible but also
politically sufficient.28 There is a certain touch of magical thinking about
21. For a general characterization of the cultural and economic politics and the political and legal thought
of this period, see NINA ESPERANZE SERRIANNE, AMERICA IN THE NINETIES (2015); ALWYN TURNER,
A CLASSLESS SOCIETY: BRITAIN IN THE 1990S (2013); DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 247-
255 (2011); Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19, 63-73 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
22. See RODGERS, supra note 21, at 256-271.
23. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED (2008).
24. See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC
HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003).
25. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION
101-111 (1999).
26. See DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM (2003).
27. For an illustrative treatment, see CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (Mark Graber, Sanford
Levinson, and Mark Tushnet eds., 2018).
28. Jedidiah Britton-Purdy, Normcore, DISSENT (Summer 2018),
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/normcore-trump-resistance-books-crisis-of-democracy.
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this kind of “normcore” utopianism, and it has a clearly discernible
demobilizing effect. As Aziz Rana noted before Trump’s loss to Biden, it
isn’t enough to think that by cancelling Trump that we will put an end to a
culture of disregard for the established taboos and principles of traditional
political intercourse. Indeed, if we fool ourselves into thinking that a
switching out of our elected officials will somehow restore balance to
American political life, the more oblivious we are about what such a
“restoration” could even mean. The “political balance” of the old normal is
itself an absolutely integral element of those historical dynamics that keep
“the country . . . trapped in [a spiral] of social crisis and popular
disaffection.”29
The conclusion seems clear enough. What we need less of is reactionary
and utopian fantasizing about rolling history back or making anything
“great again,” and more of a radical politics that can push beyond the
horizons of the social-democratic compromise.30 And yet, as we stated at
the outset, just when we need them the most the resources available for this
sort of critical engagement are largely unavailable.31 Why? To return to the
interwar moment of critical theory, that tradition that had begun with the
Frankfurt School gradually spread throughout the humanities, ranging from
the law school to the music school and everywhere in between, eventually
29. Aziz Rana & Jedidiah Britton-Purdy, We Need an Insurgent Mass Movement, DISSENT (Winter
2020),
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/we-need-an-insurgent-mass-movement.
30. See, e.g., JODI DEAN, COMRADE (2019); BERNARD HARCOURT, CRITIQUE AND PRAXIS (2020).
31. Numerous thinkers, following from and working within the critical tradition, have recognized the
odd alliance between a deadened critique and a mode of popular criticism that is everywhere. Thus the
need to reconceive the tools of critical theory for contemporary times of crisis. Bernard Stiegler, for
example, has called for a new form of critique apposite the crisis of contemporary industrial society. For
Stiegler, this society is characterized by a lack of belief in the future, a lack fostered in academic settings
by the anti-foundational theory of the 1970s. See FOR A NEW CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (trans.
Daniel Ross, 2010); TAKING CARE OF YOUTH AND THE GENERATIONS (trans. Stephen Barker, 2010).
Bruno Latour has argued that critical theory “has run out of steam” and that, rather than facts, science
and other discourses must address the concerns through which facts become facts. Bruno Latour, Why
Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern, 30 CRITICAL INQUIRY
225 (2004). Marjorie Levinson has questioned the utility of critique after its run with hegemony.
Marjorie Levinson, Posthumous Critique, in IN NEAR RUINS: CULTURAL THEORY AT THE END OF THE
CENTURY (Nicholas B. Dirks ed., 1998). For Stiegler, Latour, and Levinson, the problem with critique
is not that it fails to undermine assumptions, but that it worked so well. Along different lines, scholars
such as Barbara Smith and Barbara Christian argued that conventional forms of critical theory
fundamentally excluded nonwhite voices and identities and, moreover, failed as methodologies through
which to read the work of Black women, lesbians, and other marginalized identities for the fact that its
starting assumptions are based in European modernism. Barbara Smith, Toward a Black feminist
criticism, in THE RADICAL TEACHER (1978); Barbara Christian, The Race for Theory, 6 CULTURAL
CRITIQUE 51 (1987). Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Paul Gilroy, and Homi Bhabha acknowledged such
challenges even as they sought to inflect theory with ideas derived from traditions outside of its purview.
How can critique adapt to accommodate such voices in an age when the legacies of institutional racism
and misogyny, not to mention settler colonialism, manifest in nearly every cultural and political
situation—from the films and books we consume to our changing climate and the rights of
underdeveloped nations to modernize? Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Talking Black: Critical Signs of the
Times, 69 VILLAGE VOICE LIT. SUPP. 20 (1988); PAUL GILROY, THE BLACK ATLANTIC: MODERNITY
AND DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS (1993); HOMI BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE (2012).
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absorbed in a series of various “postmodernisms.” The situation for critical
theory became one in which, for whatever its original core might have been,
its very name became so popularized as to warrant a right to criticize
without any reservation, remorse, or reflection.32 One possible cure, of
course, is the nostalgic one: reaching back for the “old normal” of what
critical theory was—and what it stood for—in the confrontation with early-
twentieth-century fascism, and trying to replace the vulgar concept of
criticism today with the “true” critical theory of the Frankfurt School.
Whatever may be the value of such an approach, this is not our
prescription. The tools of critical theory are far from spent. But rather than
advocating a “simple” return to what in effect is a wholly European and
mostly male body of knowledge, our hope for the future of the critical
tradition is vastly more capacious and ambitious: reaching beyond the
anglosphere, beyond the old traditions of the Enlightenment, of
existentialism, of classical political economy, we envision the renewal of
critical theory in the service of relieving human suffering, fostering
meaningful human community and collaboration, celebrating the richness
of human complexity and power, remembering the sovereignty of the
human spirit and the temporality of social crisis. To assist in the work of
social transformation, the very idea of critique must eventually transform
itself, becoming non-Western, non-colonial, non-masculine.33 If the
twinned situation of society and critique is one of crisis, the task for the
critical theory of today is to become less of what it has been, and more of
what it needs to be: truly human.34
The task is daunting, to be sure. And yet, however much there may be to
fear in the crises that beset our contemporary world, we know just as well
that the human being is resourceful, thoughtful, indefatigable. There is
always more in us, as Unger likes to say, than there is in the crisis
confronting us. And as Marx famously put it, “Mankind inevitably sets itself
only such tasks as it is able to solve”: whatever problems arise before it arise
“only when the material conditions for [their] solution are already present
or [are] in the course of formation.”35 It is in the effort to reawaken our
32. See, e.g., TERRY EAGLETON, THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM (1996); PERRY ANDERSON, THE
ORIGINS OF POSTMODERNITY (1988); FREDERIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL
LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM (1992).
33. Perhaps this leads to works like ANN LAURA STOLER, DURESS: IMPERIAL DURABILITIES IN OUR
TIMES (2016); RITA FELSKI, THE LIMITS OF CRITIQUE (2015); ELIZABETH ANKER AND RITA FELSKI,
CRITIQUE AND POST-CRITIQUE (2017). Or, perhaps, it leads elsewhere, into terrains like those travelled
by VEENA DAS, LIFE AND WORDS: VIOLENCE AND THE DESCENT INTO THE ORDINARY (2006); AIJAZ
AHMAD, IN THEORY (2008); INDERPAL GREWAL, SAVING THE SECURITY STATE: EXCEPTIONAL
CITIZENS IN TWENTY-FIRST AMERICA (2017); NAHUM DIMITRI CHANDLER, X: THE PROBLEM OF THE
NEGRO AS A PROBLEM FOR THOUGHT (2013); OYÈRÓNKÉ OYĚWÙMÍ, THE INVENTION OF WOMEN:
MAKING AN AFRICAN SENSE OF WESTERN GENDER DISCOURSES (1997).
34. This vision of the human at the center of critical theory draws most explicitly on the work of Roberto
Unger.
35. KARL MARX, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 21 (Progress Publishers
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ability to envision social transformation that we ask, how can critical theory
enable a more emancipatory and revolutionary approach to the
contemporary crises that beset us?
Our intuition is that the place to start answering this question lies not at
the end, but at the beginning of this problematic. And while the particular
field of law has never been at the forefront of critical theory more generally,
we believe that this might very well have been a part of the problem. In this
respect, in the rehabilitation of critical legal theory, there is much to be
done. That said, we should emphasize at the outset that this Article does not
answer questions about what critical legal theory, or critical theory writ
large, ought to become, how it can become more emancipatory, more
liberating, more human. And given the character of the pages you have just
finished reading, no doubt such absences are likely to raise some eyebrows.
But our sense is that, before we can offer an adequate prescription for how
critical legal theory might arise in a time of global crisis, we need a much
better understanding of what critical legal theory has been. And this is not
for reasons of historical interest—far more importantly, it is because the
historical development of the critique of legal ideology may very well have
helped to insulate law from critical reimagination.
It is here that this Article makes its intervention, in the effort to expose
what we have for a hundred years taken to be legal ideology, and the
historical modes for its critique. This first move in the project to reimagine
critical legal theory takes the form of the question: what is it that helps us
to make sense of Law, to conceptualize our views of the legal world, to
make the picture we have of it cohere? For it is this “thing” which ultimately
colors our perceptions of what might or might not count as a crisis in the
first place, how big or deep this crisis is, and what role, if any, we can play
in resolving it. As we alluded to earlier, that “thing” in the language of early
critical theory was ideology, but now in this context, the ideology of law.36
In most of the late twentieth century jurisprudential debates, the concept
and language of “legal ideology” found themselves increasingly repressed
and uninvited.
In launching a program of reinventing critical legal theory for the 21st
century, we want to break this trend, asking what the concept of legal
ideology can mean, what functions it can be asked to perform, what role it
can be expected to play in the crises of our times. To be sure, this focus on
the ideology of law will strike some of our readers as exactly the sort of
nostalgia that we find to be so counter-productive. Our answer is that in
mapping out the main traditions of ideology-critique in Anglo-American
legal thought that emerged during the years of the social-democratic
1977) (1859).
36. The last substantial treatment of legal ideology, in this particular sense, is probably DUNCAN
KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION [FIN DE SIÈCLE] (1998).
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compromise, we place ourselves in a good position not only for a broader
critical stock-taking exercise, but also for the staging of any number of
programmatic proposals for what critical legal theory and legal ideology
might yet become. The different traditions of legal thought that we identify
below will not always look familiar. One will find, for example, none of the
traditional grandees of Anglo-American jurisprudence – and none of the
“classical” exchanges and debates – no Hart-and-Fuller, no Dworkin-and-
Hart, no Of Law and the River-period Carrington-and-CLS. But something
would surely be wrong if this Article, in its anticipation of a re-launch of
the critical legal project, ended up playing all the familiar tracks. When it is
the project of critique itself that is in crisis, we need to hear the deep cuts.
We envision this exploratory foray – this review of Anglo-American legal
critique – as only the first step on a long journey. In the discussion below
we begin with a brief and abstract definition of ideology-critique. We then
move on to the Four Critiques of legal ideology that have developed
specifically in the field of legal studies: Legal Functionalism, Empirical
Legal Studies, Postmodern Socio-Legal Studies, and Legal Structuralism.
I. WHAT IS THE CRITIQUE OF LEGAL IDEOLOGY?
The theory of ideology-critique that we propose to follow in these pages
has a decidedly functionalist flavor: an ideology-critique is what an
ideology-critique does. Rather than relying on scholars’ own accounts and
self-characterizations to determine whether or not their work should be
considered a form of ideology-critique, we have attempted to develop a
more or less “objective” concept of ideology-critique.37 For present
purposes, this concept can be summarized as follows:
Ideology-critique purports to expose and denounce any given argument,
doctrine, framework, or set of practices as “politically biased.” The aim is
to inform some real or imaginary audience about the existence of a
corresponding “ideology” and its deleterious effects on the particular
segment of legal practice or society. Importantly, what counts as “ideology”
37. Most functionalists and legal realists, for example, never used terms like ideology and ideology
critique. Nevertheless, a considerable part of their work, in our view, was not only distinctly critical in
its orientation but was also aimed at exposing a very specific ideological formation: that of legal
formalism and laissez-faire economic policy. To exclude this body of scholarship from our examination
simply because it did not use on the surface of its discourse certain specific phrases, we felt, would do
a considerable disservice to its legacy. It would also obfuscate the continuing influence of legal
functionalism as a genre of legal-theoretical inquiry and the impact its operative assumptions have left
on subsequent generations of legal scholarship. (Note that the background claim here is not only that we
“owe” it to the sociological jurisprudes to recognize how much of what those who came after them
achieved by climbing onto their proverbial shoulders. The argument also cuts the other way: the less
aware we may be of our debt to this body of scholarship, the more likely we will be to repeat its
mistakes.) To capture such kind of complex historical and theoretical legacies, we decided, in short, that
rather than approaching this matter in a more or less formalist fashion, it would make more sense for us
ourselves to follow a more functionalist approach: an ideology critique is what an ideology critique
does.
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has no pre-existing formula and will often change from case to case. What
matters, ultimately, is not the immediate content of what gets described or
denounced as “ideological,” but the logical relationship that is posited
thereby between that “thing” and the respective act of scholarly
intervention. Schematically, this relationship combines three assumptions:
(i) the presence of ideology in law is something that is both deeply
problematic and fundamentally under-recognized in the ordinary legal
discourse and legal scholarship; (ii) critique is the only reliable antidote
against ideology; (iii) the function of all responsible legal scholarship is to
resist ideology and to advance the cause of its critique. Acceptance and
practical realization of this three-pronged formula is, essentially, what we
propose to define as the project of legal ideology critique.
Whether it is conducted in the mainstream registers of legal realism and
its derivatives, or in the more heterodox registers of legal structuralism, the
practice of legal ideology critique must be theorized temporally. To be
clear, we do not at all mean this in the sense of it being inserted within some
kind of simplistic linear chronology in which these Four Critiques are
somehow imagined to progress one after another like so many stages in the
awakening of the Hegelian World-Spirit. Rather, the critique of legal
ideology should be contextualized as a field of overlapping practices that
move both forward and back. As a result, it is a mistake to read our survey
as suggesting that, for example, the socio-legal critique “came after” the
critique of empirical legal studies, or that functionalism is more “primitive”
than legal structuralism. Our ordering is a function of how we have stylized
the structure of argumentative practice, moving along the seams of an
“inside-outside” distinction about the historical context of law. The outline
of that progression is offered in the appendix which follows this Article on
page 581.
It is in this posture that we offer two premises for the argument that
unfolds ahead. The first is that there exists more than one concept of
ideology circulating within the contemporary legal-academic discourse.
The second is that a very large part of what legal scholarship does or
purports to do is aimed at critiquing ideology, the implicit understanding
there being that “ideology” generally stands for some kind of a ruse,
misconception, or mystification. The claim that a large segment of
contemporary legal scholarship is animated by this kind of confrontational
dynamic, and that a legalized “hermeneutics of suspicion” has become the
Ur-form of contemporary legal thought, is not, of course, very new.38
38. The concept of the hermeneutics of suspicion was introduced in 1965 by the French philosopher
Paul Ricoeur to capture the idea of a theoretical outlook strongly committed to unmasking the “illusions
and lies of consciousness” and “circumvent[ing] the obvious and self-evident meanings in order to draw
out less visible and less flattering truths.” Rita Felski, Critique and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion, 15
M/C J. (2012), http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/viewArticle/431. See
PAUL RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION (1970). Since then it has
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However, the claim that we can find in the contemporary legal discourse
several entirely different models of ideology, and that each of these models,
furthermore, is culturally active and theoretically productive, is much less
familiar. It is rather commonplace to say that a lot of what legal scholars do
and say is motivated by arguments, narratives, and concepts that can be
challenged as “ideological.” But what exactly does “ideological” mean in
each of these contexts?
This Article suggests that there exist four very different traditions of
answering this question. They repeat across different segments of the legal-
academic literature, or at least that part of it that is available in the English
language.39 They are:
(i) Legal Functionalism40
(ii) Empirical Legal Studies41
come to be used to describe a general mode of thought characteristic of much of contemporary social
theory, literary criticism, etc. For an exploration of the different ways in which this mode of thought has
come to be practiced by US legal scholars, see Duncan Kennedy, The Hermeneutic of Suspicion in
Contemporary American Legal Thought, 25 L. & CRIT. 91 (2014).
39. Like with most taxonomies, our categorical scheme is far from perfect. It would be futile to pretend
otherwise. Under functionalism, for example, we have decided to include much of what would
sometimes be described as legal realism. Decisions like these (and there are many) are open to charges
of overgeneralization and post-hoc syntheticism. What has been “added” quite legitimately could be
regarded as fundamentally un-addable, either because doing so has suppressed too many differences that
otherwise are important or because, in their original historical contexts, the proponents of the respective
schools or movements passionately disagreed with one another’s approaches or generally could not
stand one another. A classic example would be the famously hostile exchange between Karl Llewellyn
and Roscoe Pound about the place and use of realist methodologies which indicated a rift between the
realist camp and the earlier tradition of socio-legal studies. See Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence – The Next Step, 20 COL. L. REV. 431 (1930); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist
Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931); Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism, A Reply to
Dean Pound, 44 HARV L. REV. 1222 (1931). But see also N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL
LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1997) (arguing for a more nuanced view
of this episode and reaching beyond the public confrontation to show the strong mutual respect and
admiration the two scholars had for one another). Taking all this into account, it may be better to think
of each of these proposed groupings more as helpful heuristics than as markers of historically active
categories of self-identification that the scholars discussed below would recognize as their own. It may
also be helpful to remember that, in practice, most works of ideology critique—the actual books, articles,
and essays people write—will tend to combine, even if only unselfconsciously, the elements of more
than one tradition. No text is ever entirely homogenous in terms of its intellectual profile. Even Duncan
Kennedy’s A Critique of Adjudication, a text exemplary in its critical vigilance and self-awareness
otherwise, on closer inspection turns out at different points to draw on several of the traditions canvassed
in this Article, in ways that are not always easily reconcilable.
40. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (part III), 36 HARV. L. REV. 940 (1923);
Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1911);
Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935);
NICHOLAS TIMASHEFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF Law (1939); EUGEN EHRLICH,
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 488-95 (1936) [1913]; CHARLES A. BEARD,
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913).
41. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH
(2014); LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013); Wolfgang Alschner, The Impact of Investment Arbitration on
Investment Treaty Design: Myth Versus Reality, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2017); Wolfgang Alschner et
al., Champions of Protection? A Text-as-Data Analysis of the Bilateral Investment Treaties of the GCC
Countries, 2017 INT’L REV. L 1 (2017); Denise M. Keele et al., An Analysis of Ideological Effects in
Published versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 6 J. EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 213 (2009); Gregory Shaffer
and Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1
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(iii) Postmodern Socio-Legal Studies42
(iv) Legal Structuralism43
The remainder of this Article provides an exposition of each of the Four
Critiques. Before turning to that discussion, however, we offer a brief
introduction to some of the intellectual connections between them. In
Europe, the custom of critiquing “suspect” patterns of legal reasoning and
forms of legal-theoretic thought as ideologically motivated goes back to the
end of the nineteenth century. Under the influence of French solidarist
jurisprudence and the German “free law” movement, there emerged a
tradition of what later came to be known variously as “legal sociology” and
“sociological jurisprudence.” In the United States, by contrast, the critique
of ideology in law traces its roots generally to the tradition commonly
known as American legal realism.44 Over the middle decades of the
twentieth century, these two traditions gave rise to a number of different
theoretical movements and, accordingly, a number of different ways of
thinking about the phenomenon of ideology in a legal context.
Initially there emerged what we call the First Critique, that of a
“functionalist” critique of legal ideology. Its principal target was the
(2012).
42. See, e.g., Susan Silbey, Legal Cultures and Cultures of Legality, in HANDBOOK OF CRITICAL
SOCIOLOGY 470 (JOHN R. HALL ET AL. EDS., 2010); Susan Silbey, Everyday Life and the Constitution
of Legality, in BLACKWELL COMPANION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE 332 (MARK D. JACOBS AND
NANCY HANRAHAN EDS., 2005); Roger Cotterrell, Law in Culture, 17 RATIO JURIS 1 (2004); ROGER
COTTERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (2002); MICHAEL TIGAR, LAW & THE RISE
OF CAPITALISM (1977); Joanne Conaghan, Gendered Harms and the Law of Tort: Remedying (Sexual)
Harrassment, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 407 (1996); PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW:
RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999); Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal
Realism?: Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J. L. &
HUM. 3 (2001); Austin Sarat, The Profession versus the Public Interest: Reflections on Two Reifications,
54 STAN. L. REV. 1491 (2002); Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat, Critical Traditions in Law and Society
Research, 21 L & SOC REV. 165 (1987); CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF
THE STATE (1989); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, THE SEDUCTIONS OF QUANTIFICATION: MEASURING HUMAN
RIGHTS, GENDER VIOLENCE, AND SEX TRAFFICKING (2016).
43. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV L. REV.
1685 (1976); Karl Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358 (1982);
Karl Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4
INDUS. REL. L. J. 450 (1981); Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); John Henry Schlegel, The Ten Thousand Dollar Question, 41
STAN. L. REV. 435 (1989); Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047
(2002); JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006);
Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L. J. 997 (1985).
44. An important qualification has to be made, of course, in respect of “diagnosing” entire career oeuvres
and scholarly life projects as being or not being a part of something called “legal realism” or some other
such thing. Choosing to work in the mode of one tradition at one point in your career is not at all a
guarantee that you will not switch to another tradition later. People change, their views about law and
legal study evolve. Large segments of Karl Llewellyn’s The Common Law Tradition, for example,
indicate a strong predisposition towards what in the context of this Article’s argument could be identified
as the Legal Structuralist tradition. By contrast, most of The Cheyenne Way, written twenty years before
that, seems to belong squarely within the Post-Empiricist socio-legal studies tradition, while many parts
of The Bramble Bush—especially that first lecture—betray an unmistakable affinity for functionalism.
Evidently, what Llewellyn thought about law, ideology, and critical legal thinking in his late sixties
changed quite dramatically from what he had to say on the subject in his forties or mid-thirties.
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ideology of legal formalism and its main defining trait was its faith in the
critical power of social sciences: to recognize the contours of formalist
ideology and to free the legal mind from its pernicious influence required
an earnest and whole-hearted engagement with the burgeoning science of
society. For these thinkers, formalism was a smokescreen that blocked one’s
view of law’s objective reality, and the social sciences a crisp wind to clear
the air. The more the legal professional took to heart the lessons of social
sciences, the main of which, as functionalism’s name suggests, was to view
all legal phenomena in essentially functional terms, the quicker we would
all break out from the prison-house of ideology.
Several decades after functionalism, but still operating within the same
broadly “realist” umbrella, there developed the Second Critique, a body of
scholarship called empirical legal studies (“ELS”). In the First Critique, the
phenomenon of ideology was conceptualized as something akin to an
intellectual virus operating on the “inside” of legal thought and discourse,
compelling jurists to adopt sloppy modes of reasoning. In the Second
Critique, however, ELS scholars conceived of ideology as an essentially
external force: a factor that approaches Law from the “outside” and, if not
properly checked, threatens to corrupt the course of the jurist’s reasoning,
thus politicizing the broader operation of the legal system. How can the
corrupting influence of this externalized, ideological threat be checked? The
answer, as the name “empirical legal studies” suggests, is to follow a
rigorous empirical protocol: if we want to establish the objective truth about
any given legal event, process, or abstract doctrinal question, our thinking
about it has to be grounded in empirically verifiable observations. Detailed
statistics, accurate data, and careful measurement are the best defenses
against ideological corruption.
Note the fundamental distinctions between the First and Second
Critiques: for legal functionalists, ideology presents itself as naturally
harmonizing philosophy, and what it tended to do to legal professionals was
delude them into misrecognizing the objective realities of law. What they
saw as abstract forms and principles, were in truth, fragments of a politically
contingent social system. In the ELS tradition, by contrast, the concept of
ideology assumes a much more concrete expression. Ideology shifts away
from a natural plane of legal philosophy and into a personal agenda or a
partisan bias, and its real-world impact is the quotidian corruption of the
judicial process. Such perversions include, most notably, the facilitation of
a culture of illegitimate judicial activism.
Note also the basic parallels between the two Critiques: both for legal
functionalists and for ELS scholars, legal ideology is largely
indistinguishable from political ideology, and the path to redemption in
each case begins with the push for greater analytical rigor, intellectual due
diligence, and a system of interdisciplinary check-and-balances. Law, in
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short, is a species of politics. The first task of all responsible legal
scholarship is to show us how and why this state of affairs should be ended,
and its first ally in this endeavor is the world of social sciences. For
functionalists, the problem is an ideology of illusion internal to law, and the
answer to the question of critical method was found in the concept of
sociology writ large; for ELS scholars, the problem is a political ideology
external to law, and the answer lies in the empirical study of the influence
of that political relation.
The Third and Fourth Critiques are those of postmodern socio-legal
studies, and legal structuralism, respectively. The Third and Fourth
Critiques also trace their genealogy from a broad combination of American
legal realism and European legal sociology. Unlike functionalism and
empirical legal studies, however, they take a rather dim view of the standard
realist belief in the emancipatory power of scientific objectivity, analytical
rigor, and the use of empirically derived data. They are both, to some degree
at least, post-empiricist. For these latter two Critiques, the idea of objective
knowledge, especially in its application to legal phenomena, is deeply
problematic. And while, of course, trying to be more analytically rigorous
in one’s reasoning and paying more attention to the empirical patterns of
different types of legal conduct are not in themselves bad things (and
indeed, in today’s intellectual climate seem all the more worth cherishing),
from the perspective of the Third and Fourth Critiques it is difficult to see
how empiricism offers a way out of ideology, inasmuch as empiricism
simply offers yet another ideological manifold. Indeed, some of the most
deeply ideological theoretical projects in the history of twentieth-century
legal thought have been grounded in decidedly rigorous analytical protocols
– think, for example, of the Chicago-style law-and-economics45 or
Kelsenian positivism46 – or channeled an intellectual sensibility that is
nothing if not expressly committed to empirical self-awareness – think
again of Chicagoan law-and-economics or the ELS tradition itself for that
matter.
A general attitude of skepticism in respect of realism’s empiricist legacy
is not, of course, the only factor that distinguishes the Third and Fourth
Critiques from the First and the Second. Another important line of
distinction cuts through their respective conceptions of law’s general
relationship with politics. While no theoretical movement is more
commonly associated today with the thesis that “all law is politics” than
critical legal studies (CLS), a school of thought that (in its first wave)
epitomizes the structuralist tradition more effectively than any other, the
45. For a general background on the Chicago tradition in law-and-economics, see NICHOLAS MERCURO
& STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 51-83 (1997).
46. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW & STATE (2006); HANS KELSEN,
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY (1992).
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idea of law-as-a-direct-continuation-of-politics has been much more of a
defining theme for the postmodern law and society people. Indeed, the most
distinctive feature of the early CLS approach to the concept of legal
ideology came in a rather different context: it was its reinsertion of the
standard realist critique of the legal form into the broader framework of
structuralist semiotics that really set the CLS tradition apart from everyone
else.47 In this perspective, the basic ontology of legal ideology was neither
that of a “substantive theoretical mistake” that inspired an incorrect
understanding of the legal doctrine (the view of legal functionalism), nor
that of a “corrupting external factor” that led to the proliferation of
illegitimate judicial activism (the view of empirical legal studies). For legal
structuralism, the site of legal ideology is the legal system’s collective
unconscious. It is the very “grammar” of legal thought that made law as a
social system and a form of reasoning, compelling legal decision-makers to
recognize only some categories of claimants and to ignore the plight of all
others, to privilege only some kinds of economic and social interests, and
to downplay the rest.
As a result of this reorientation toward a distinctively legal conception of
legal ideology, legal structuralism not only managed to bring greater
attention to the essential ubiquity of ideology in law but also, with its
emphasis on ideology as an indispensable attribute of the legal form itself,
proceeded to carve out three entirely new objects of study for the students
of legal ideology: (1) the foundational structure of the legal unconscious,
(2) the operative lexicon of the black-letter law system, and (3) the
generative patterns of legal argument (or what has also been called the
patterns of legal justification).
A third factor that separates socio-legal and structuralist critiques from
the functionalist and ELS critiques is the much wider range of theoretical
influence relevant to each. The first and the most obvious source of
inspiration was Marxism. In both the Third and Fourth Critiques, it is
important to emphasize that the legal form reifies, entrenches, and
naturalizes the very same political and economic inequalities which the
legal system otherwise is supposed to address and remedy. In both cases,
the idea shows a profound influence of Marxist and post-Marxist thought.
Of course, the broader model of the general relationship between the legal
and the economic domains differs rather significantly from that assumed in
classical Marxist theory. But neither of these Critiques would have
developed its understanding of legal ideology the way that it did without a
deep and serious engagement with Marxism.
In addition to Marxism, one finds traces of many other “grand theories”
in the two “post-empiricist” modes of ideology-critique, from Freud’s
47. See DESAUTELS-STEIN, supra note 17, at 35-70.
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theory of the Id and Weber’s theory of disenchantment to Foucault’s
concept of disciplinary power and Judith Butler’s idea of gender
performativity. The degree of borrowing in each case varies. In the Fourth
Critique, for example, phenomenology is important, particularly in the way
it consistently dismisses the dualist ontology of “inside” and “outside” so
central to the functionalist and the ELS traditions.48 From the legal
structuralist point of view, there is no “inside” of legal reason in which one
can find, say, the correct undistorted meaning of legal concepts, doctrines,
and institutions. Nor, by the same token, is there really such a thing as an
easily identifiable “outside” from which a judge or a legal scholar can
import their partisan politics or personal agenda into their analysis of the
legal materials. What there is instead are structures of legal languages, a
never-ending series of lived engagements with it on the part of individual
judges and scholars, engagements that allow them to experience this
structure both as something spontaneously self-evident, natural, and
practically useful, as well as something deeply alienating, frustratingly
rigid, and reified.
The same skeptical attitude towards the inside-outside ontology can also
be found, albeit not as visibly, in the Third Critique. Here the argument is
typically made in a more tentative fashion and is given a fundamentally
different explanatory logic. The central theme comes from the idea of
dialectics or mutually constitutive performative practices. The concept of
law, the argument goes, has no fixed essence: the boundaries of the legal
system vis-à-vis the broader social reality beyond its plane, just like the
boundaries of legal thought vis-à-vis other discursive and cultural forms,
are not only inherently malleable but also historically contingent. As the
mutually constitutive relationship between Law and Society or Law and
Culture shifts and evolves, Law, being both that which it positively is and
that which is a negative image of what it is not, constantly spills over into,
and opens itself up to, its various dialectical counterparts, thus making any
attempts to establish a fixed boundary between its “inside” and its “outside”
impossible.
Each of these summaries, of course, capture the Four Critiques in broad
and often blurry contours. Our aim in sketching them so impressionistically
has been to convey a sense of some of their relations with one another, and
in so doing, to lay the ground for this article’s main thesis and contention.
It is to this effort that we now turn.
II. FIRST CRITIQUE: LEGAL FUNCTIONALISM AND THE CRITIQUE OF
48. Id. at 71-93.
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LEGAL FORMALISM AS GRAND IDEOLOGY
A. The End of Ideology
The combined effects of the two world wars and the economic
catastrophes of the period in-between helped consolidate a consensus about
the appropriate route for political, social, and legal change.49 This consensus
was two-sided. On the one hand, there developed a particular view about
how to define the specter of “ideology.” On the other hand, there emerged
a program for what to do after ideology had been properly abandoned.
To the first hand, first. In these postwar years of the United States, there
was the increasingly popular idea among intellectuals that the hortatory
powers of the grand ideologies, writ large, had gone out of fashion. On this
view, an ideology was considered something like a broad blueprint for
social engineering, a set of interconnected ideas that necessarily led to
particular forms of political action.50 This purportedly neutral construction
of ideology could manifest in any political program, left, right, and center.51
As Raymond Geuss suggested, “a ‘total ideology’ was (a) a program of
action (b) based on an explicit, systematic model or theory of how the
society works (c) aimed at radical transformation or reconstruction of the
society as a whole (d) held with more confidence (‘passion’) than the
evidence for the theory or model warrants.”52 An ideology, on this view,
was like the dinosaur: Classic Liberalism, Capitalism, Socialism, Fascism,
Anarchism—these were the sorts of master narratives that had once
dominated the political imagination, but whose time had come and gone.53
These ideologies, these programmatic and totalizing if not totalitarian
visions for political and social action, had characteristically taken the form
of rigid formulas and doctrinaire plans, and in the context of this postwar
consensus, grand ideologies were disfavored for exactly this reason.
By the 1950s and ‘60s, many American scholars were suggesting that,
rather than rely on totalizing ideologies, what was needed instead were more
realistic, more flexible, more functional, more empirical assessments of real
people’s needs. And it was this latter prescription for a more realistic
understanding of society that reflects the second side of the postwar
consensus. The dogma of ideology, in this consensus view, stood in poor
contrast against the rich and supple postures of interdisciplinary expertise.
49. See HOWARD BRICK, TRANSCENDING CAPITALISM: VISIONS OF A NEW SOCIETY IN MODERN
AMERICAN THOUGHT (2015); RAYMOND ARON, THE OPIUM OF THE INTELLECTUALS (1955); Michael
Polanyi, On Liberalism and Liberty, 4 ENCOUNTER 29 (1955).
50. DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 402 (1962).
51. MARTIN SELIGER, IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS (1976).
52. RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY: HABERMAS AND THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL 11
(1999).
53. FELIKS GROSS, EUROPEAN IDEOLOGIES: A SURVEY OF TWENTIETH CENTURY POLITICAL IDEAS
(1948).
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Or to put that another way, whereas totalizing ideologies had been the
currency of the long nineteenth century, a postwar End of Ideology program
suggested a turn to real, material needs and interests.54 What had gone
wrong? Ideology in the sense of grand political narrative. What to do?
Pursue a program grounded in the empirical expertise of the social sciences
that rejected ideological dogma. Here, ideology comes to be defined
precisely as the opposite of a naturalizing empiricism.55
For sociologists associated with the “End of Ideology” program like
Daniel Bell, blueprint ideology was a problem less deserving of a solution
than of just being avoided altogether. As Bell explained it, nineteenth
century visions of capitalism simply failed to meet the needs of modern
industrial society.56 Here had been the
image of capitalism in the early forties: the capitalist was an old miser
sitting on his pile of sterile bullion, which weighed down the economy.
Since he found it impossible to inject the money into an economy
which needed it, if that economy was to provide jobs and the standard
of living it was technologically capable of producing, the government
would have to force him to disgorge it—or tax it away and spend it on
useful projects.57
The traditional ideological emphasis on private property and freedom of
contract as the engines for laissez-faire, Bell assured, had finally lapsed.
The ideology of traditional capitalism was, here in the middle of the
Twentieth Century, exhausted.58
If so, perhaps, the ideology of socialism was the preferred alternative?
Nope. Like the doctrinaire vision of laissez-faire capitalism, the doctrinaire
ideology of a socialist world order was also too disconnected from the real
world of social needs and interests. “The socialist movement,” Bell
explained,
by the way in which it rejected the capitalist order as a whole, could not
relate itself to the specific problems of social action in the here-and-now,
give-and-take political world. In sum, it was trapped by the unhappy
problem of living in but not of the world . . . It could never resolve, but only
straddle, the basic issue of either accepting capitalist society and seeking to
transform it from within, as the labor movement did, or becoming the sworn
enemy of that society, like the Communists. A religious movement can split
its allegiances and (like Lutheranism) live in but not of the world . . . a
54. Howard Brick, The End of Ideology Thesis, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES
(Michael Freeden and Marc Steers, eds., 2013).
55. See, e.g., GEORGES CANGUILHEM, A VITAL RATIONALIST: SELECTED WRITINGS (2000); BRUNO
LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN (1993).
56. BELL, supra note 50, at 85.
57. Id. at 80.
58. Id.
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political movement cannot.59
All in all, Bell claimed in what came to be the call-sign of the new post-
ideological consensus, the “End of Ideology” had arrived.60 In its place
would come a social-democratic compromise, a mixed economy, the
Welfare state, decentralized power, and above all, an understanding of the
necessity of an anti-ideological, utterly realistic view of politics, the market,
and civil society.61
The program for political science, economics, and sociology was up and
running.62 But what of law? Ought judges, lawyers, and legal theorists make
a similar turn?63 If so, what would the “End of Ideology” mean for the
postwar world of law? Interestingly, a version of the story had already been
in the telling, and this was the story of legal realism.64 Now to be sure, there
are few areas of legal thought as contested as just what exactly the legal
realist movement had been all about. And given our current interest in
mapping out twentieth-century forms of ideology-critique, we will abstain
from engaging the full breadth of that fascinating conversation.65 However,
a point about which there is little disagreement is that much of legal realism
was set against something called legal formalism—another contested
terrain.66 If we follow Bell’s version of the problem of ideology, however,
we arrive at what is at least a useful shorthand for thinking about the First
Critique: a functionalist critique of legal formalism as a distinctively legal
ideology, a grand master plan of Law, a blueprint for judges tasked with the
business of matching the legal order with the immanence of the natural.67
Thus, just as sociologists and political scientists would come to offer an
empirically-grounded realism as the antidote to the grand ideologies of the
59. Id. at 278-279.
60. See, e.g., SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN 404-405 (1960) (“The fact that the differences
between the left and the right in the Western democracies are no longer profound does not mean that
there is no room for party controversy. But as the editor of one of the leading Swedish newspapers once
said to me, ‘Politics is now boring. The only issues are whether the metal workers should get a nickel
more an hour, the price of milk should be raised, or old-age pensions extended.‘ These are important
matters, the very stuff of the internal struggle within stable democracies, but they are hardly matters to
excite intellectuals or stimulate young people who seek in politics a way to express their dreams. This
change in Western political life reflects the fact that the fundamental political problems of the industrial
revolution have been solved: the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship; the
conservatives have accepted the welfare state; and the democratic left has recognized that an increase in
over-all state power carries with it more dangers to freedom than solutions for economic problems. This
very triumph of the democratic social revolution in the West ends domestic politics for those
intellectuals who must have ideologies or Utopias to motivate them to political action.”).
61. Id. at 402.
62. See DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1990).
63. SeeDavid Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development,
82 YALE L. J. 1 (1972).
64. See, e.g., John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the
Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459 (1979).
65. See Symposium: The New Doctrinalism: Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
1845 (2015).
66. See DESAUTELS-STEIN, supra note 17, at 123-151.
67. Id.
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nineteenth century, realist-inspired jurists offered a similar critique of the
ideology of legal formalism.68
To get a picture of this legal ideology writ large in the language of legal
formalism, consider the illustrative work of the economist-philosopher
Friedrich Hayek. As Hayek described his project in The Constitution of
Liberty:
The conception of freedom under the law that is the chief concern of
this book rests on the contention that when we obey laws, in the sense
of general abstract rules laid down irrespective of their application to
us, we are not subject to another man’s will and are therefore free. It is
because . . . the judge who applies them has no choice in drawing the
conclusions that follow from the existing body of rules and the
particular facts of the case, that it can be said that laws and not men
rule . . . This, however, is true only if by ‘law’ we mean the general
rules that apply equally to everybody. This generality is probably the
most important aspect of that attribute of law which we have called its
‘abstractness.‘69
In crafting this naturalizing understanding of law, Hayek drew an
important distinction between the Rule of Law (rules that apply equally and
generally) and legislation (rules that are partisan). The former concept—the
Rule of Law—is what gives the human subject its freedom. This freedom-
enhancing quality is a result of several factors, one of which is its
provenance. For Hayek, the Rule of Law is not the product of deliberate
human consideration. It is rather a natural evolution, a material to be
discovered in the world rather than produced.70 These naturally evolving
common law rules are neutral, general, and abstract, discoverable and
applied by the judiciary, without any preference for a particular class or
party. Hayek continued, “[f]or here no human decision will be required in
the great majority of cases to which the rules apply; and even when a court
has to determine how the general rules may be applied to a particular case,
it is the implications of the whole system of accepted rules that decide, not
the will of the court.”71 Citing John Marshall, Hayek intoned, “[c]ourts are
the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing.”72
In contrast with this vision of the Rule of Law, Hayek identified
legislation as a rival way of formulating legal prescriptions. Whereas the
Rule of Law gives freedom, legislation and regulation take it away. As a
68. See Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1988).
69. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 221-222 (1978) (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 225 (“Most of these rules have never been deliberately invented but have grown through a
gradual process of trial and error in which the experience of successive generations has helped to make
them what they are. In most instances, therefore, nobody knows or has ever known the reasons and
considerations that have led to a rule being given a particular form. We must thus often endeavor to
discover the functions that a rule actually serves.”).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 224.
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political act of intervention, legislation “emanates from the legislative
authority [and] is the chief instrument of oppression.”73 This oppressive
form of law is outcome-determinative and focused precisely on partisan
interests, whereas the Rule of Law is general and neutral. Citing Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. in support of the prevalence of this politically oriented
view of legislation, Hayek warned that “[t]o say that laws rule and not men
may consequently signify that the fact is to be hidden that men rule over
men . . . The confusion of these two conceptions of law and the loss of belief
that laws can rule;” Hayek further explained “that men in laying down and
enforcing laws in the former sense are not enforcing their will, are among
the chief causes of the decline in liberty.”74
Even with this very brief sketch we can already see the outlines of the
kind of grand ideology that so worried the sociologists and political
scientists.75 Hayek’s was a vision that assigned marching orders for judges
and lawyers, tasking them with the completion of a legal order that properly
mirrored the historically evolved norms of property and contract, and the
separation of judges from so-called political points of view. Of course, for
the legal realists and their heirs, Hayek’s seemingly neutral conception was
itself a form of political ideology, assigning to Law a blueprint for action
somehow immanent in the very fabric of law itself. To avoid Hayekian
errors of this sort, the post-realists would divest Law of these ideological
trappings by studying the legal discipline as it actually was, not through the
lens of a broad and impossible ideology. What the ideology of legal
formalism produced was a sense that law was fully autonomous from
society, in precisely the way that mathematical principles are autonomous
of social context. But this was a mistake, for law was deeply embedded in
society, and law could only be understood in that social context. Law wasn’t
like math at all. And so it was in this way that the “End of Ideology”
program in political science and sociology joined an alliance with legal
scholars, giving rise to an approach called legal functionalism.76
B. Functionalism over Formalism
The single most important theme at the heart of the First Critique was
captured already at the start of the twentieth century by the great dean of
American jurisprudence Roscoe Pound, and it was this: there exists a
fundamental difference between what the legal system looks like “in the
books” and what it looks like “in action.” It is the latter picture that is more
accurate, and the business of all forward-looking legal scholarship is to
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J.
(1924).
76. See Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
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work tirelessly on uncovering and reporting it.77
Focusing only on studying the “law in the books,” argued Pound, was not
just a recipe for ignorance and self-deception. It was also advocated by the
most reactionary political elements in the legal academic community, the
so-called “legal formalists,” or as Pound described them in his 1908 article,
the erstwhile proponents of “mechanical jurisprudence.”78 Formalists,
Pound contended, blocked the study of law in action because they were
worried that if people came to know how the legal system actually
functioned in practice, it could put the lie to the idea of law as a mechanical
system. At stake was the highly conservative political program embodied
in much of the existing case law, a program which the legal formalists
sought to legitimate by presenting the case law in question as a product of
neutral, objective, politically impartial legal reasoning, and to entrench
through the suppression of inquiries into the program’s social and economic
consequences.
Fighting legal formalism was not just a matter of giving support to a
historically progressive political cause. No less importantly, it was also a
prerequisite for achieving a greater degree of theoretical hygiene.
Regardless of whether this is what “formalists” even really believed, for
Pound and thinkers like him, the thesis that judges could and should decide
disputes solely on the basis of deductive logic and close textual analysis of
the applicable rules and precedents was pure sleight of hand. A socio-legal
inquiry that married the empirical observation of law’s practical
consequences with a systematic investigation of law’s role in “social
engineering” was the most effective antidote to magical thinking.
Around the same time as the development of Pound’s sociological
jurisprudence, something similar was cooking up in continental Europe.
One of the principal dramatis personae was the Austrian legal scholar
Eugen Ehrlich, a founding figure in the modern discipline of legal
sociology. As Ehrlich saw it, the examination of statutes and court reports
was of little value in the hunt for law’s “true reality.” In relation to statute
books, Ehrlich observed,
[any] attempt to imprison the law of a time . . . within the sections of a
code is about as reasonable as [the] attempt to confine a stream within
a pond. The water that is put in the pond is no longer a living stream
but a stagnant pool, and but little water can be put in the pond.79
In contrast with Holmes’ belief that the study of law was essentially an
inquiry into what courts will do in fact,80 Ehrlich believed that a myopic
focus on judges was a disservice to the sociological project. A singular
77. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12 (1910).
78. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
79. EHRLICH, supra note 40, at 488-95.
80. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897).
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focus on court reports resulted in an inevitable distortion:
Only a tiny bit of real life is brought before the courts and other tribunals;
and much is excluded from litigation either on principle or as a matter of
fact. Moreover the legal relation which is being litigated shows distorted
features which are quite different from, and foreign to, the same relation
when it is in repose. Who would judge our family life or the life of our
societies by the law-suits that arise in the families or in the societies?81
In a modern capitalist society, where so much of legal practice is
conducted by means of legal formalities, of course it was true that most
lawyers began their assessments of the applicable law by studying the
respective legal documents. Ehrlich maintained, however, that it would
always have to be “supplemented by direct observation of life”:82 “of
commerce, of customs and usages, and of all associations, not only of those
that the law has recognized but also of those that it has overlooked and
passed by, indeed even of those it has disapproved.”83 For even if it is only
the content of the written contract and nothing else that will be “enforced
by the courts . . . in case the parties resort to litigation,” outside the judicial
setting, the legal rules embodied in this document are going to be the “living
law” only insofar as the parties in question “habitually insist” upon
following them.84 Any failure to recognize this fact “results in an erroneous
and distorted picture of life itself.”85
One may protest, following Holmes, that in most cases the lawyer is only
required to know what the courts are most likely going to order by way of
official enforcement. But Ehrlich argued that the enterprise of legal work is
not judged only by its potential usefulness to the world of legal practice.
The achievement of theoretical clarity and the maintenance of analytical
rigor are critical to knowing the “living law.”
Of course we can learn only so much of the living law from the
document as has been embodied therein. How shall we quarry that part
of the living law that has not been embodied in a legal document but
which nevertheless is a large and important part thereof? There is no
other means but this, to open one’s eyes, to inform oneself by
observing life attentively, to ask people, and note down their replies.
To be sure, to ask a jurist to learn from actual observation and not from
sections of a code or from bundles of legal papers is to make an
exacting demand upon him; but it is unavoidable, and marvellous
results can be achieved in this manner.86
Some twenty years after Ehrlich, another prominent East European jurist
81. EHRLICH, supra note 40, at 488-95.
82. Id. at 495.
83. Id. at 493.
84. Id. at 498.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 505.
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would take Ehrlich’s outline of the new method to its full logical
conclusion. The “object of the new science called the sociology of law,”
explained the Russian émigré scholar Nicholas Timasheff, consisted of
“[t]he determination and the coordination of human behaviour in society by
the existence of legal norms.”87 Its “chief method” was “causal-functional
investigation,”88 and its central presumption was the idea that law was but
“one of the forms of social coordination.” Law was the specific “structure
of this form of coordination, i.e. the system of human actions and reactions
composing this form” and the “conditions of its efficacy or nonefficacy”
that constituted the sociological lawyer’s main object of investigation.89 To
perform it successfully, the jurist required a strong grasp of the applicable
legal regime, but also empirical erudition and a broader awareness of law’s
place in society. “Abstract configurations of chains of human actions and
reaction must be searched for,” Timasheff explained, “chains in which legal
norms and aspects of human behaviour fulfil alternately the active or
passive roles.”90 Where Ehrlich’s idea of legal sociology went little further
in its methodological sophistication than “actual observation,” Timasheff
demanded an accounting for every legal nook and cranny. One had to pay
attention to subjective self-reportage, but also take into account general
sociological observation, social experiments, and comparative legal study.91
Back in the U.S., another classical illustration of the First Critique is
available in Felix Cohen’s legendary essay from 1935, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach.92 Whether he realized it or not,
Cohen’s title captured not just the essential thrust of realism but also one of
the fundamental intellectual trends of his time. There is the explosive and
critical energy associated with the demolition of “transcendental nonsense,”
or what Bell would later call “Ideology,” and there is the professional work
of getting down to business, the “functional approach” that would give the
moderns their own blueprint for legal empiricism. These two parts reflect
the two sides of the “End of Ideology” consensus already alluded to and
was soon coming around the corner: (1) Formalized abstractions about
property, contract, or “the rule of law” were more than impractical. As
“blueprints for action,” such concepts described legal architectures that
mischaracterized the reality of law. (2) After departing from the
transcendental nonsense of legal abstraction, the work to be done was, as
Bell might have said, in the give-and-take world in which the domains of
87. TIMASHEFF, supra note 40, at 30.
88. Id. at 30-31.
89. Id. at 31.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 38-40.
92. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809
(1935). For some of the background to this essay and a contextualizing discussion, see DAVID KENNEDY
& WILLIAM FISHER III, THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 163 (2006).
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law and politics necessarily bleed from one to the next. This understanding
of the “End of Ideology” led to the task at hand, what Cohen called the
functionalist approach. Like Pound, Ehrlich, and Timasheff, functionalists
would consequently come to assess the complex social reality in which legal
concepts are embedded, all the various social interests in play, their
functions, their social contexts, and everything else.93
This turn to legal functionalism marks the passage between the realist
critique of legal ideology (in the guise of an abstract Hayekian type of
formalism) and the practical work of what would later become known as
the Legal Process school.94 The idea was that even if it was impossible to
determine ex ante the correct substantive answer to any given controversy,
it should always be possible to put in place a properly calibrated, balanced,
and intellectually rigorous decision-making process. And if taken seriously,
that process would enable its participants to arrive at sufficiently reasonable
and pragmatic solutions. The background theoretical framework that gave
this narrative its internal coherence was a combination of the classical
liberal distrust of all forms of subjectivism, idealism, and moral
absolutism,95 a definition of objectivity as a function of inter-subjective
inclusivity and respect “for reason,”96 and a belief in the possibility of
“minimizing resentments” by reinforcing procedural formalism.97 The core
idea, however, was the assumption that form and technique could usually
replace substance and ideals.98 “Arriving at decision through clearly
delineated procedures, based on objective principles,”99 offered the best
insurance against political bias and abuse, and the key to making the best
use of this general insight was understanding the distinction between
“questions of value or of positive fact.”100 Only rarely, the argument went,
lawyers might find themselves caught up in a genuine moral dilemma: the
so-called “hard case” scenarios, where personal ethics and grand abstract
ideas would necessarily come into play.101 But most of the time, problems
confronting a legal decision-maker could be easily recast as questions of
“positive fact” and thus safely removed from the arena of subjective
opinion. One version of the argument found the key to doing so in looking
for “issues of expedience” rather than “issues of principle.” Another
93. DESAUTELS-STEIN, supra note 17, at 152-71.
94. Charles Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1 (2013).
95. On the centrality of this distrust to the classical liberal tradition, see generally UNGER, infra note
132.
96. See GEOFFREY KABASERVICE, THE GUARDIANS: KINGMAN BREWSTER, HIS CIRCLE, AND THE RISE
OF THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT 112 (2004).
97. Id. at 111-12.
98. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 253 (1992).
99. KABASERVICE, supra note 96, at 109.
100. Cohen, supra note 92, at 820.
101. Id. at 841.
28
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol31/iss2/9
2021] Deep Cuts 463
focused on the need to ensure as wide a representation in the legal arena of
all the competing interests present in the “political marketplace” as may be
reasonably possible, so that whatever consensus might emerge out of these
interactions could safely be confirmed, as a matter of positive fact, to be an
embodiment of the society-wide – and therefore unbiased in any narrow
partisan sense of the term – objective morality.102
The central text of the Legal Process tradition was the famously
unpublished (but widely circulated) eponymous set of teaching materials
prepared in the mid-1950s by Harvard professors Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks.103 And though the general intellectual politics it expressed often
stood in contrast against that of the realist generation, there was a rather
visible direct line of descent that connected the Legal Process tradition to
the realist lessons about functionalism.
Functionalism, as Cohen explained, was essentially “a call for the study
of problems which have been neglected by . . . scientific methods of
observation.”104 In the absence of any autonomous method for determining
the correct application of legal materials to social problems, guidance came
from social reality itself. What started out as a searing act of critique
“logically” evolved into a celebration of positivist social science. What had
been wrong with legal formalism, in the end, was not just that formalists
had values and politics whose existence they sought to deny, but that these
values and politics were also “out of touch with social reality” because they
channeled and expressed only the narrow class interests of the legal elite in
question. To offset this classist bias, it became necessary to expand the base
from which social values and politics would be imported. The wider this
base became, however, the more pressing became the challenges of
establishing a robust enough procedure to feed the respective value content
into the corresponding segments of the legal debate. The solution – in
addition to commissioning in-depth anthropological studies of what
different groups of people actually believed and valued – obviously required
paying more and more attention to matters of institutional design, technical
details, and the art of discourse-moderation.
As early as the mid-1930s, notes Morton Horwitz, scholars like Lon
Fuller began to question the “political implications of the realist turn to
social science.”105 Having started out as an intellectual radical reform
movement, realism, noted Fuller, like Pound’s legal sociology before it,
inevitably gravitated in the direction of “an essentially reactionary” political
program.106 A large part of it, he concluded, could be traced to the particular
102. See Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory – and Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223,
228 (1981).
103. HORWITZ, supra note 98, at 254.
104. Cohen, supra note 92, at 829.
105. HORWITZ, supra note 98, at 211.
106. See Lon Fuller, American Legal Realism, 92 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 461 (1934).
27
Desautels-Stein and Rasulov: Deep Cuts: Four Critiques of Legal Ideology
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository,
464 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 31:2
theoretical compromise its version of the critical enterprise ended up
endorsing. To bring the functionalist method into law, as the likes of Cohen,
Pound, Ehrlich, and Timasheff proposed, was to advocate essentially the
assumption of a decidedly empiricist theoretical outlook. The problem with
the general idea that lawyers had to pay greater attention to law’s immediate
social context was what exactly, in the given context, the concept of “paying
greater attention” was really supposed to mean. In the particular cultural
setting in which these arguments had been made, the common assumption
seemed to be that it basically meant embracing a relatively crude vision of
anthropological empiricism:107 try to see what people usually do, ask them
what they think about that, tweak a thing or two, record any patterns that
appear to emerge, see if anything like “a dominant characteristic”108 can be
identified that might explain these patterns. Rinse and repeat.
To critique legal ideology in the functionalist mode was to advocate for
the replacement of a commitment to formalist solipsism with this sort of
naïve empiricist protocol. But since empirical inquiries provided ever-
increasing masses of frequently indeterminate data, the real question for the
functionalist lawyer became: What sort of process should one institute in
order to give all these empirical findings about the “living law” the proper
response and recognition that it deserves? As Charles Barzun notes of the
Hart and Sacks materials,
Hart and Sacks were thus groping, however awkwardly at times, to
define law as an academic discipline with methods that could properly
be understood as scientific, comparable to those employed by
economists, psychologists, or sociologists. In short, Hart and Sacks
sought to justify their characterization of law as a ‘craft’ on the grounds
that all knowledge, including that derived from the social and even
natural sciences, was, in a sense, craft knowledge—that is, knowledge
of how to do something.109
Consistent with both Bell’s assessment of the necessary blending of
capitalism and socialism, and Cohen’s legal functionalism, these post-
realist scholars believed in an analogy between the work of legal theorists
and the work of social scientists—work that had the same aim, namely, to
better describe and understand the world in which we live. Hayekian types
lived in the world of Law, but they were not of it. The Legal Process
tradition would correct this mistake. It was the task of lawyers and judges
to learn from the disciplines of economics, political science, and sociology
107. See John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular
Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 195, 262 (1980) (“Moore started with something close to a
crude anthropology: Ask the natives what they do. And for a scientific demonstration he relied on what
would today be known as a natural experiment. The natives on one side of the river carry water on
shoulder poles, those on the other side, on their heads; what accounts for this difference?”).
108. Schlegel, supra note 64, at 542.
109. Barzun, supra note 94, at 7.
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in order to both better predict legal outcomes and chart the “best” course for
those outcomes,110 and the adepts of the Legal Process approach took this
idea as its always-already assumed starting point. It was not only that
lawyers work to uncover law’s “external” reality, its shape and presence in
“social life.” An equally central task was to ensure that all these empirical
findings were brought together in as objective and procedurally inclusive a
manner as possible.
As the preceding discussion illuminates, the First Critique is premised on
two essential distinctions. The first distinction is the one between “law” and
“non-law”: the institutional and normative structures of the legal system and
the external social context in which these structures are situated. Law, from
the standpoint of legal functionalism, has to be situated vis-à-vis its
surrounding political, economic, and social context, because it is only
through this process of contextualization that lawyers can gain purchase on
law’s true reality as it is actually “lived.” This is the key to the legal
system’s real and potential capacity for changing the world outside itself.
The thrust of the First Critique is to unmask the internal space of Law as a
relatively distinct social form. At the same time, it denounces the
assumption that the truth of this social form can ever be grasped if the jurist
fails to exit the “insides” of law.
Legal functionalism’s second distinction also takes the form of an inside-
outside dichotomy. The difference is in the location of the proposed
boundaries: where in the first case the essential dividing line was drawn
between Law and its Social Context, in the second case the dividing line
separates the subjective process of legal thought, i.e. the reasoning
developed by a judge or a legal scholar, from the objective substance of the
legal doctrine, i.e. the legal materials on which this act of reasoning focuses.
Attentive readers will note that a similar assumption was made in the
formalist tradition. But is not formalism the sworn enemy of the
110. Holmes has suggested as much in an earlier piece, again pointing to how typical it was for thinkers
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functionalist? Sure. But while functionalists would attack formalism for its
misplaced solipsism, and urge the displacement of formalist analytics by
ones grounded in the idea that Law and its Social Context are mutually
constitutive, the traditional formalist distinction between reasoning and
doctrine, practice and material, rules and their application was, for the most
part, kept intact. After all, so long as legal doctrine might survive as an
independent and autonomous terrain “outside” of the subjective terrain of
judicial reasoning, the Rule of Law remained safe.
Keep in mind: the form of legal reasoning that is presented as ideological
in the First Critique is that typically characteristic of the traditions of legal
formalism, mechanical jurisprudence, and all other similarly inward-
looking, deductively-driven protocols of legal thought (such as, for
example, natural law). The worrisome possibility that legal functionalism
might itself prove ideological was ruled out from the start. Unlike the
formalism of mechanical jurisprudence, denounced as “fake legal science”
(the “fake news” of its time), functionalism gives the discipline the keys to
a real legal science. And science, because it is true, objective, and
empirically verified, by definition, cannot be ideology. As we will see
below, the functionalist critique of ideology would, in time, serve itself as
a target for the Third and Fourth Critiques. But before turning to those
developments, let us first survey the way in which the intellectual attitudes
of the First Critique were deepened in the space of the Second.
III. SECOND CRITIQUE: EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES AND THE CRITIQUE OF
JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY AS PIECEMEAL POLITICS
A. Empirical Legal Studies and Judicial Activism
As the twentieth century progressed, the First Critique’s functionalism
had some dramatic effects. First, and despite the efforts of the functionalists
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troubling questions for those aspiring for traditional fidelity to the Rule of
Law. If judges were now meant to adjudicate disputes more “realistically”
about the law’s role in serving social needs, what of the idea that ours is a
government of laws and not men? Does not the task of formulating socially
responsible laws belong to legislators, not judges? Was not the Rule of Law
essentially a conception of legal rules that might be applied impartially,
generally, consistently, and impersonally, without a view of the instant
outcome? And if the answers were in the affirmative, how to reconcile such
a Rule of Law conception with a view of the legal process that was explicitly
post-hoc, purposive, and just downright political?
Second, the term “ideology” itself underwent a transformation. No longer
understood as signifying some broad blueprint of transcendental nonsense
pace Hayek, the specter of ideology shrank dramatically. While the grand
and totalizing legal ideology of the formalists had been an object of critique
for the realists and functionalists, in the wake of the First Critique the
concept of “ideology” went from being conceived as a massive plan for Law
to a mere synonym for politics, or a lawyer/judge’s policy preference. The
effects of this reduction are still with us today: ask of a judge’s “ideology,”
the answer will surely revert to something of the judge’s political views.
The idea that a judicial ideology might refer to a “total ideology” like
Capitalism or Socialism or some Hayekian philosophy is today very
unusual; it is rather to ask of what the judge thinks about abortion, or gun
control, or judicial activism itself. A judicial ideology now refers only to
piecemeal politics, never the grand master plan. Thus, the “End of
Ideology” program generated not the end of ideology in law, but rather both
a diminishment and relocation of ideology in law. Whereas in the First
Critique the target was a large-scale campaign to promote the power of an
autonomous Law, the result was to reduce ideology to a kind of piecemeal
politics existing outside the space of law, properly understood. The phrase
“legal ideology” no longer really made sense, since the problem was now
about a distinction between a judge’s political views (which would come to
be called “judicial ideology” or “judicial politics”), and the law’s non-
ideological, internalized workings.
Phrases like “judicial ideology” and “judicial activism” are suggestive of
the character of the Second Critique. In the contemporary rhetoric of the
law school, newspapers, television punditry, and the like, the specter of
judicial activism is premised on the possibility of a judge not being an
activist, or not being ideological in her adjudications. After all, if there was
no choice about whether a judge might exercise her ideological preferences,
or if a legal ideology was so pervasive that its effects had little to do with
one’s political preferences, we could hardly criticize. That is, despite the
popularity of the “End of Ideology” program and the power of legal
functionalism, the idea that judges might still decide cases in the light of the
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Rule of Law, bereft of ideological influence, retains considerable rhetorical
power. Indeed, every time we hear a complaint about judicial activism or
the interference of judicial ideology (again, which is now simply a synonym
for politics), the complaint is that the judge allowed her subjective opinions
to trump what ought to have been an impersonal application of rule to fact.
This might suggest Chief Justice Roberts’ analogy between judges and
umpires, or something less sporty, but in any case, what is left after legal
functionalism is a contemporary contest between a shrunken sense for Law
(no longer conceived as a grand master plan) and a shrunken ideology
(construed as a judge’s personal politics). Ultimately, the relevant effect of
the “End of Ideology” program is a shoring up of the old idea that on the
one side of the ledger is a reduced legalism or the Rule of Law, and on the
other side is a reduced ideology or policy preference. Law qua law is not
ideological. Law only becomes ideological once Politics infects the legal
scene.111
It would seem that judges are largely conscious of this contest between
the “internal” demands of a non-ideological Rule of Law and the “external”
demands of small-scale political ideology.112 In the wake of legal realism
and legal functionalism, judges, lawyers, and academics actively negotiate
the effort to keep judicial ideology at bay. Indeed, playing the barbarian at
the gate, ideology as politics is regularly conceived as among the keenest
threats to the Rule of Law.113 This particular version of the problem, as we
have suggested, is a consequence of the mid-century functionalist attack on
ideology. That attack was at once a pillory on abstraction and a prayer for a
more politically-oriented understanding of law—but an understanding of
111. Joshua Fischman & David Law, What is Judicial Ideology and How Should We Measure It? 29
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133 (2009).
112. Richard Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519 (2012).
113. See ALLAN HUTCHINSON & PATRICK MONAHAN, eds., THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY
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law in political context, not a politicization of law from the inside, of law
itself. If we wish to understand the political, economic, and social process
in which law happens, we were told, we have to leave behind the old-
fashioned fantasy of the Rule of Law, and create it anew.
It is precisely because so many jurists did not want to leave that old-
fashioned fantasy behind that today’s truest heirs to the “End of Ideology”
program are not found in the legal mainstream but are instead working in
the interdisciplinary space occupied by political scientists and empirically
minded legal scholars.114 We say that these may be the true heirs of the “End
of Ideology” program because, while many jurists desire fidelity to a Rule
of Law, the most aggressive forms of “realism” are practiced by the political
scientists. Rather than paying attention to what judges say,115 they focus on
what judges “actually” do. This is an intellectual task resolved through the
observation of judicial conduct,116 empirical indicators purported to capture
the operative logic of the judges’ hidden behavioral reality.117 The
“internal” domain of legal reasoning, it turns out on this view of things, is a
red herring when it comes to ideology. Legal reasoning is just for show,
perhaps a necessary illusion, but ultimately nothing more than cover for the
“external” reality of judicial politics.118
One of the main constructs developed among political scientists to study
this external space of judicial ideology was “the attitudinal model.”119 Used
to explain the background causal relationships that connect a given set of
facts and the judge’s propensity towards bias or impartiality, the model’s
central premise derives from the idea that a judge’s personal policy
114. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002); Thomas Miles &
Cass Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008).
115. Id. at 35.
116. See generally, J. Mitchell Pickerill & Christopher Brough, Law and Politics in Judicial and
Supreme Court Decision Making, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Robert M.
Howard & Kirk A. Randazzo, eds., 2018).
117. Jeffrey Segal, Judicial Behavior, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (Robert
Goodin ed., 2008).
118. This is what political scientists sometimes call “the legal model” of judicial behavior. It is generally
discredited. JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
48 (2002). But see Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018
(1996); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUDGES MAKE (1997); Tonja Jacobi, The Impact
of Positive Political Theory on Old Questions of Constitutional Law and the Separation of Powers, 110
NW. U.L. REV. 259 (2006).
119. HAROLD SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING 64 (1979). Political scientists sometimes link
the attitudinal model to an “indeterminacy thesis” associated with legal realism. As Michael Bailey and
Forrest Maltzman put it, “[t]he attitudinal model builds on two intellectual foundations. First, legal
realism in the early twentieth century highlighted the indeterminacy of law. This indeterminacy allows
justices to inject their personal views (perhaps unconsciously) into the development of the law.” The
second foundation is “the behavioral revolution in the middle of the twentieth century.” MICHAEL
BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS
JUSTICES MAKE 4-5 (2011). We agree, however, with Epstein and Knight when they argue that “[i]n
fact, it was less the realists’ writings than an empirical observation that led Pritchet to consider the
importance of ideology in the first place.” Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Reconsidering Judicial
Preferences, 16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 11, 13 (2013).
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preferences (judicial ideology) are the strongest determinants in producing
a given case’s outcome: judges who have “liberal” political leanings will
make “liberal” decisions, judges who have “conservative” leanings will
make “conservative” decisions.120 The key question, of course, would be
how to determine a judge’s political leanings in the first place. In the years
since the attitudinal model was first proposed, there have emerged a number
of alternative methods for discovering and measuring what is understood to
be the judges’ background ideological influences, ranging from the very
basic and primitive to truly complex and sophisticated.121 Curiously enough,
most of them make more sense the higher up we go the proverbial food
chain: Supreme Court justices apparently have the most amount of
“ideological” discretion, while trial court judges have the least.122
These developments in the field of political science inevitably triggered
a parallel process in legal scholarship,123 including the emergence of a
theoretical project expressly preoccupied with the empirical analysis of
judicial behavior.124 Following the lead of political scientists Jeffrey Segal
and Harold Spaeth, legal scholars like Lee Epstein and Jack Knight
popularized the view that, as demonstrated by their extensive empirical
studies, legal reasoning played very little role in deciding legal
controversies. To explain the objective reality of judicial decision-making,
they argued, one would be better served adopting a rational choice or
“strategic account” outlook that focused on understanding and recording
each given judge’s personal policy preferences. In part perhaps because it
was developed by scholars with sophisticated training in both the
disciplinary fields of law and political science, Epstein and Knight’s
“strategic account” theory did not, unlike the basic attitudinal model,
assume that these personal policy preferences told the whole story.125
Rather, it explained, “justices are strategic actors who realize their ability
to achieve their goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of other
actors, the choices they expect to make, and the institutional context in
which they act.”126 Following this important example, in subsequent years
120. HAROLD SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DATABASE (2015).
121. Christopher D. Johnston et al., On the Measurement of Judicial Ideology, 37 JUST. SYS. J. 169
(2016); Adam Bonica et al., Measuring Judicial Ideology Using Clerk Hiring, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
129 (2017); Michael Bailey, Measuring Judicial Ideology, in Howard & Randazzo, supra note 116.
122. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 231 (2013).
123. The entire discipline of law and economics is, in a sense, a variety of this End of Ideology after-
effect. Like those scholars fascinated with judicial activism and ideology, law and economics scholars
have for more than a generation sought out the economic explanations for what is “actually” going on
behind the legal curtain. Lauren Edelman, Rivers of Law and Contested Terrain: A Law and Society
Approach to Economic Rationality, 38 L. & SOC. REV. 181 (2004).
124. See generally, LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL
RESEARCH (2014).
125. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED 111-13 (2012).
126. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 118, at 10. See also Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Economic
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it became increasingly common for ELS scholars to present ideology as an
extremely potent, but non-exhaustive variable in the determination of
judicial decision-making.127
We have canvassed now two different modes of ideology-critique in law.
The First Critique belongs to legal functionalism. Functionalist scholars
challenged the starting assumptions of legal formalism which implied that,
both as a social phenomenon and as a mode of discourse and reasoning, law
could exist in a relatively splendid isolation from the rest of the broader
social context. The critique they constructed was a critique of ideology
conceived as a grand masterplan: a totalizing vision and a philosophy that
was not just dead wrong in substance but also all-powerful in terms of its
rationalizing effects. To counter the influence of this sort of totalizing vision
required apprehending the law in the context of its true social reality: the
living law, law in action, law as it actually functions. Analytically, the
functionalist model of ideology-critique is premised on two structural
distinctions. The first is the distinction between law and the external non-
legal (social) context in which law has to be situated in order to understand
its reality. The second is the distinction between law’s objective constituent
materials – legal rules, doctrines, operative concepts – and the mental
understanding one can have of these materials. To become a victim of
ideology is to allow the “wrong” theory of law to cloud one’s mental
understanding.
The Second Critique belongs to the tradition of empirical legal studies, a
movement that in historical terms emerges roughly half-a-century after the
first sighting of the functionalist tradition. After the fall of formalism, the
internal space of law was no longer thought of as a proper location of
ideology, since that inner space had been “cleaned out” of its formalist
dogma. Functionalist reasoning, in contrast, was not ideological, since it
was just a way of getting at law’s political reality. Ideology was now placed
on the political outside, and the critic’s task was to understand the ways in
which this ideological outside could influence the relatively inert
internalized space of law. Spurred on by the writings of scholars like Segal,
Spaith, Epstein, and Knight, a new concept of ideology gradually began to
take form, one that conceived of ideology as an essentially external factor
operating from outside the properly legal plane and entering it through the
personal politics and biases of legal actors. In this posture, the social reality
of ideology devolves essentially into extra-legal values, prejudices, and
partisanship, and the practice of rigorous empirical inquiry is imagined to
Analysis of Judicial Behavior, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Lee Epstein &
Stefanie Lindquist, eds, 2017). For early criticism and advocacy for positive political theory, see Frank
Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511 (1998).
127. See, e.g., Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions about Judicial Decisionmaking?
58 DUKE L.J. 1531 (2009); CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).
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provide the most effective defense and prophylactic against ideology’s
corrupting influence. There is, thus, on the one hand, a system of positive
legal rules, doctrines, and institutions and, on the other hand, the
relationship that connects this system to the ideologies of individual legal
actors, such as judges. This relationship forms the principal object of study
for every critically inclined scholar, and the methodology of empirical
analysis is the main theoretical instrument this scholar is meant to use. The
implied assumption here, in other words, holds that empiricism does not
only offer an entirely reliable protection against ideology – it also
immunizes its practitioners against ideological infection.
Worth noting are some continuities between the two Critiques. Both abide
by the distinction between an internalized Law and an externalized Society,
and in this sense the Second Critique is fundamentally beholden to the First.
In order to gain purchase on Law’s reality, we must bypass the ideological
mirage. For the First Critique, the illusion is the one that fools us into
thinking that Law is autonomous from its social contexts. Proponents of the
Second Critique agree wholeheartedly. But they push the ball forward,
claiming that the illusion is that legal reasoning in any form has a substantial
impact on the way judges go about making their decisions. It is not that
these scholars have come to conclude that functionalism is as ideological as
formalism, since they accept the necessity of placing law at the service of
social context. It is rather that they see all modes of legal reasoning as
basically useless.
Where the two Critiques most substantially differ is on the question of
how to locate the ideological trouble-maker. In the First Critique, as we
have explained, the target is the “internal” space of Law, for this is where
legal formalism was thought to reside. In the Second Critique, which takes
for granted the successful work of the First, focus comes to the political
space “external” to Law. For it is in the judge’s political preferences that
we find the motors of judicial activism, and it is this form of small-scale
political ideology that the Second Critique is out to expose and denounce.
B. Ideology as Manipulation
A basic assumption on the part of both of the first two Critiques is that
ideology is something that generally sits at the intersection between politics
and language but ultimately goes beyond simple, blunt propaganda.
Ideology involves a certain process of language manipulation—”twisting
words,” “playing with meaning”— that is performed with a view to induce
politically significant effects, for example, by changing people’s ideas and
representations about the world around them and their place in it. But it does
not just “tell” people that they should do something right here and right
now.
A classic example of this way of thinking about ideology can be found in
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the oft-quoted definition by Martin Seliger: “Ideology is a set of ideas by
which men posit, explain and justify ends and means of organized social
action, and specifically political action, irrespective of whether such action
aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order.”128
Generally, this way of thinking about ideology is characterized by a strong
sense of instrumentalism—ideology is either a tool that people deploy or an
art-form that they practice—as well as a deeper, underlying belief in
concepts like scientific neutrality, objectivity, truth, empirical facts, and
impartiality. In this view, what is crucial about ideology is that it concerns
how people use language and ideas when they communicate with one
another. What sets “ideological discourse” apart from “scientific discourse”
is the distinct refusal or failure to remain objective and impartial in ways
that result in politically significant consequences. The failure to remain
objective and impartial comes as a result of ignoring empirically
substantiated facts in favor of some pre-established set of convictions. The
only effective antidote is the consistent promotion and cultivation of the
kind of culture of critical self-awareness and analytical rigor traditionally
associated with natural sciences. The less there is enthusiasm for sciences
and knowledge informed by empirical evidence, it follows then, the higher
will be the likelihood of ideological “capture.”
And what follows from ideological capture? Politics, in a nutshell, is the
process of some people governing other people. Much of this process
presumes and relies upon coercion. An even larger part, however, is
premised on the dynamics of consent: whether through coercion or not,
those who are governed, ultimately, must consent to the rule so imposed.
Ideology, on this view of things, is what allows the powerful to bypass or
limit the need to use coercion by going straight to the moment of consent.
The key to achieving this objective is the mastery of what the British
journalist Steven Poole, in a pointed reference to George Orwell’s Nineteen
Eighty-Four, calls the art of unspeak—smuggling super-charged political
opinions under the cover of ostensibly neutral and objective language.129
What is it that makes unspeak so effective? The typical answer is that it
is something about our modern society itself that prevents us from “seeing
clearly.” What makes the art of unspeak possible is not an inbuilt weakness
of the human mind. It is that the social forms in which we live and breathe
128. SELIGER, supra note 51, at 14. That this definition represents one of the most widely used points
of reference in the literature on ideology, is not difficult to see. It is cited and invoked, often both as a
starting point and as a working definition, by everyone from critical theorists to political scientists. See,
e.g., Daniel Koehler, Deradicalization and Disengagement Programs as Counter-Terrorism and
Prevention Tools. Insights from Field Experiences Regarding German Right-Wing Extremism and
Jihadism, in COUNTERING RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM AMONG YOUTH TO PREVENT
TERRORISM 120, 130 (Marco Lombardi et al., eds., 2015); Christopher Flood, “Introduction,” in
POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE 1, 1 (Christopher Flood & Laurence Bell, eds.,
1997); TERRY EAGLETON, IDEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 6-7 (1991).
129. STEVEN POOLE, UNSPEAK (2006).
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grow ever more complex and opaque. As the American economist John
Kenneth Galbraith famously put it in his account of the practices of
“conventional wisdom”:
Because economic and social phenomena are so forbidding, or at least
so seem, and because they yield few hard tests of what exists and what
does not, they afford to the individual a luxury not given by physical
phenomena. Within a considerable range, he is permitted to believe
what he pleases. He may hold whatever view of this world he finds
most agreeable or otherwise to his taste.130
By manipulating the language that is used to describe and represent the
social forms around us, practitioners of unspeak change people’s ideas and
views about the world, including their beliefs about right and wrong. In this
tinkering with beliefs about good and bad, natural and artificial, universal
and particular, the “unspeakers” encourage their audience to consent,
decide, and conclude in ways which they otherwise may have rejected or
resisted. In doing so, ideology makes the art of politics and government less
violent and less overtly oppressive. It also makes it more insidious and
deceitful.
The narrative of ideology as the practice of unspeak belongs to a tradition
which is predicated on a broadly conspiratorial understanding of legal and
political speech, and the field of public discourse more generally. It seeks
to discern motives and biases, cover-ups and slippages, moments of “spin”
and “sleights of hand.” In doing so, it construes ideology as a largely
conscious or semi-conscious practice performed by those “in the know” on
an unsuspecting public. It often brings focus to the importance of belief
systems, assumptions, epistemology, evidence-based reasoning, the
knowledge of facts, “forgotten history lessons,” and objective truth.131
Historically, from the broader cultural standpoint, an enthusiasm for this
mode of ideology-critique has been mostly characteristic of what might be
generally termed the classical liberal mindset in the sense of liberalism as
the shared philosophical sensibility of Kant, Montesquieu, and Adam
Smith, rather than liberalism as a left-leaning political agenda.132 Inasmuch
as this mindset continues to remain the dominant cultural mindset across
the broader space of contemporary Anglo-American public discourse, the
idea that ideology is essentially a form of politically motivated lying
130. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 7 (1999) [1958].
131. For typical examples, see, e.g., Vishaal Kishore, Free Trade and Comparative Advantage: A Study
in Economic Sleight of Hand, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LAW 90 (UGO
MATTEI AND JOHN HASKELL, EDS. 2015); MATT KENNARD, THE RACKET: A ROGUE REPORTER VS. THE
MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE 55-66 (2015); DAVID MARQUAND, MAMMON’S KINGDOM: AN ESSAY ON
BRITAIN, NOW 77-96 (2014). See also, more generally, JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS (2002); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000).
132. For further background on the classical liberal tradition, see DESAUTELS-STEIN, supra note 17, at
123-151; ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); DOMENICO LOSURDO, LIBERALISM: A
COUNTER-HISTORY (2011).
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remains the most popular approach to constructing the concept of ideology
in modern Anglo-American usage. It is also the underlying message of the
First and Second Critiques of legal ideology.
IV. THIRD CRITIQUE: POSTMODERN LAW & SOCIETY SCHOLARS AND THE
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICE
As we transition from the first two Critiques and their grounding in
empiricism as the antidote to ideology, the concept of ideology shifts in the
space of the Third Critique, moving out of what we can call an ideological
foreground and into a more murky “background.” As we explain below, this
understanding of ideology as background will draw on quite different
intellectual resources than those we have seen so far, including Marxism
and postmodernism. Advocates of the first critique of legal formalism were
emblematic of a general interest in finding some middle way between “rigid
formulas” of capitalism and socialism, the so-called great ideologies. And
it really was a “middle way,” not some way that might discard capitalism
and socialism altogether. Indeed, there was much that the End of Ideology
theorists found attractive about socialism, including Marx’s emphasis on
the material foundations of politics and civil society. It is, after all, only a
short step between Marx’s materialist emphasis on life “on the ground” and
the functionalist mantra of social needs and interests. As Marx explained,
[t]he premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas,
but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the
imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the
material conditions under which they live, both those which they find
already existing and those produced by their activity.133
But whereas Bell and others would press this “materialism” into the
service of constructing a “modern” approach to liberalism, Marx’s critique
was already aimed precisely at just such an intellectual maneuver. As Slavoj
Zizek has argued, “the idea of the possible end of ideology is an ideological
idea par excellence.”134
We will return to this point, but for now let us state at the outset how the
Third Critique both distinguishes itself from and allies itself with the prior
two. First, whereas the functionalist critique targets ideology in the internal
space of Law, and the ELS critique targets ideology in the political spaces
external to Law, the Third Critique—postmodern socio-legal studies—
orients itself toward a complex blurring between the two spheres of Law
and Society. As we will see, the main vehicle for this blurring is the idea
that certain types of everyday legal practices constitute at one and the same
133. KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY: PART ONE (C.J. Arthur ed.,
1970).
134. SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY (2009).
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time “social” and “legal” practices, which means that drawing any
distinction between them is really more a matter of choosing a particular
“perspective” rather than uncovering their “objective essence.”135 A
different way of putting this is to say that the Third Critique places ideology
both on the “inside” and on the “outside” of the legal form, by recognizing
that Law and Society are mutually constitutive forces.136 It is this emphasis
on perspective, mutual causality, and the primacy of hybrid practices that
are at once and always already both legal and social, that lends this Third
Critique the label of the postmodern.
Second, postmodern socio-legal studies is nevertheless consistent with
legal functionalism and empirical legal studies in the sense that all three of
them give at least some degree of credit to the value of legal rules, while at
the same time taking a rather skeptical stance in relation to the “elite” and
“mandarin” forms of legal reasoning.137 Like their ELS cousins, however,
socio-legal scholars assume that the bulk of ideological content lies beyond
the terrain of legal rules and legal argument.138 But unlike ELS, they put
forward a much broader conception of legal ideology, how ideology really
functions, and in particular, how it functions to legitimate the interests of
the powerful at the expense of the subordinated.139 For proponents of the
Third Critique, it is a mistake to reduce the concept of legal ideology to
personal values or individual policy preference. Where ELS seeks to
identify the political biases shaping the course of judicial decision-making,
the Third Critique of socio-legal studies purports to analyze the “everyday”
basis of every aspect of law’s social reality.140 This is that shift from
foreground to background, mentioned above. Thus, in the Third Critique,
the phenomenon of ideology refers as much to the specific set of strategies
and practices that conceal any contradictions in the lawyers’ professional
experience of the legal system, as it does to the idea of a more “global”
collective consciousness that conceals the broader system of power
hierarchies. Moreover, while the ultimate function of ideology is to enable
and sustain a regime of political repression, its mechanisms and practices
are not only diffuse and complex, but also highly disparate, local, particular,
and frequently working at cross-purposes.141
135. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (1972).
136. Marianne Constable, Genealogy and Jurisprudence: Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Social
Scientification of Law, 19 L. & SOC. INQ. 551 (1994).
137. See Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991).
138. Alan Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of the Concept
of Ideology to the Analysis of Law, 19 L. & SOC. REV. 11, 16 (1985).
139. See LAW, STATE, AND SOCIETY (Bob Fryer et. al. eds. 2018).
140. ALLAN HUTCHINSON, TOWARD AN INFORMAL ACCOUNT OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 123 (2016).
141. Trevor Purvis & Alan Hunt, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology . . . ,
44 BRIT. J. SOC. 473 (1993).
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Third, the Third Critique is also consistent with the first two in that it has
at least a partial connection to the empiricist tradition. To be sure,
proponents of the Third Critique have at times argued for a “post-
empiricist”142 approach to legal ideology. But that’s the point. Even while
complicating the premises of what empirical study can really accomplish,
socio-legal studies—even in its postmodern manifestation—aspires to make
good on the basic promise of empirical social science, even while cognizant
of that tradition’s deepest limitations. Indeed, just as empiricism in the
hands of ELS scholars is very different from empiricism in the hands of
functionalists like Ehrlich and Pound, so too is it different yet again in the
hands of the socio-legal people that we survey below—many of whom
fundamentally disagree about the essence of the empirical project.143 And
yet, despite all the differences, all three Critiques share a basic commitment
to some form of empiricism as ideology’s bête noire.
As noted earlier, the concept of ideology underwent a considerable
amount of shrinking as it made the passage from End of Ideology
functionalism into ELS. Once conceived as a grand masterplan and a
totalizing vision, ideology reduced to the status of individual partisan bias
and personal agenda. On the one side was the ideology of policy preference,
and on the other was, simply, the black box of Law. The principal task for
ideology-critique was to identify how the former invaded the latter, and the
142. For discussion, see. e.g., Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Room for Maneuver: Paradox, program, or
Pandora’s Box? 14 L. & SOC. INQ. 149 (1989); Hendrik Hartog, The End(s) of Critical Empiricism, 14
L. & SOC. INQ. 53 (1989).
143. See generally, Mark Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical
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task was to figure out how to measure the effects of that invasion. The Third
Critique, however, assumes that ideological misconceptions are organic.
Ideology needn’t be the product of nefarious manipulation or the unspeak,
and when ideology is at its most effective, conscious and foregrounded
manipulation is only a small piece of the story. Indeed, on this view of
things, the question of agency in the struggle against ideological distortion
turns out to be less a function of any one person’s individual actions or states
of mind, and more a matter of a backgrounded collective consciousness.
Ideology, from the perspective of the socio-legal mode of critique, finds its
true ground in collective experience, and less in the type of language
manipulation discussed above. It is, on this view, only at the level of a
society-wide collective consciousness that ideology can be contested and
resisted.
A. The Marxist Baseline
The shift from the individual to the collective marks a significant
departure in the evolution of the critique of legal ideology,144 and the
theoretical tradition underpinning this view goes back to Hegel, Herder,
Schiller, and other philosophers of the Spirit. The essential theme, as Philip
Allott puts it, is that of a “social psychology” in which every “society
generates a social consciousness, a public mind, which is distinct from the
private mind [and] the consciousness of actual human individuals.”145 If we
assume that ideologies are collective delusions, then we can only
understand ideological capture in reference to the respective social body, to
the way the history of that social body as a collectivity has unfolded, and
the way the material givens of its current existence as a collectivity are
organized. Only by bringing about a radical and comprehensive change of
these material givens, and thus changing the actual composition of the social
body itself, might we clear the ideological air. Far from being just an
instrument or a form of manipulation practiced by skilled, self-determining
agents, in this Third Critique, the concept of ideology presents itself as a
“sleep of reason.”146 With its potential to envelop society tout court, the
masses remain ignorant of the divide between the true realities of their lives
and the illusory dreamworld of ideology. It is the task of the critical project
144. We ask that the reader treat our usages of terms like “evolution” with great heaps of salt. As we
have said, we are not claiming that there is anything like a historical continuity or causal set of linkages
between the four critiques surveyed here.
145. See PHILIP ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE STATE 291 (2002).
146. The reference here is to one of Francisco Goya’s most famous drawings, “The sleep of reason
begets monsters.” The picture, which depicts a sleeping artist surrounded by a pack of ominously
swirling bats and owls, has long served as the archetypal metaphor for the Enlightenment-style
rationalist negation of prejudice and superstition and the belief in the emancipatory power of critical
awakening. For a typical illustration, see Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L. J. 453 (1996).
For a more complex interpretation of the concept (and the sentiment behind it), see Alexander Nehamas,
The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters, 74 REPRESENTATIONS 37 (2001).
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to expose this dreamworld for what it is, and to chart a way out.
Two basic theoretical innovations therefore separate the general outlook
of the socio-legal critique from its functionalist and ELS cousins. The first
innovation is the idea of the collective consciousness. The presumption here
is that social groups tend to develop their own “public minds,” which means
they also develop a propensity for some form of “group consciousness.”
The second innovation is the idea of the indispensability of mass-scale
radical action. If ideology is the sleep of reason spreading across the
collective consciousness, we must awaken the collective agent, not just
some of its individual members. Of course, to awaken a whole society from
an induced slumber is no walk in the park. Individual-level solutions that
work at the level of individual consciousness won’t do it, but a
programmatic theory for social transformation just might.
In most introductory texts on social theory, the standard example of such
a program is the classical Marxist tradition.147 Indeed it is Marxism, with its
insistence on separating the economic base (basis) from the legal, political,
and cultural superstructure (überbau), that on the whole provides the most
familiar reference points and tropes around which the broader universe of
postmodern social-legal scholarship revolves: false consciousness,
alienation, reification, fetishism, “the incongruence between the realm of
ideas and the economic reality,” “the ruling worldview is the worldview of
the ruling class,” “ideas are nothing but an expression of material
relationships,” “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their
existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness,”
etc.148
Scholars working in the tradition of the Third Critique may well substitute
economic relations of production with material structures of racism,
patriarchy, or colonial conquest and subjugation—the model remains
essentially the same.149 The ideological mechanism is not just another form
of distortive discourse or the importation of one’s personal agendas into the
legal process. Ideology is an integral part of the broader social fabric in
which we live, an inevitable consequence of humanity’s socialization, of
our coming to live together with one another. Wherever we find social
groups, we find ideology in the tendency towards struggle, relations of
147. See, e.g., ALEX CALLINICOS, SOCIAL THEORY: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTIOn 82-4 (2007).
148. See, e.g., MARX, supra note 35, at 20-21. See also GEORG LUKACS, HISTORY AND CLASS
CONSCIOUSNESS 83-110 (1971); KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY: PART
ONE 42-68 (C.J. Arthur ed. 1970); G. V. PLEKHANOV, IN DEFENSE OF MATERIALISM 193-202 (1947).
149. See, e.g., SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX (2015); DENISE THOMPSON, RADICAL
FEMINISM TODAY (2001); Elizabeth Flynn, Composing as a Woman, 39 COLLEGE COMP. & COMM. 423
(1988); WALTER RODNEY, HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA (rev. ed. 1982); EDWARD SAID,
ORIENTALISM (1979); Roxane Dunbar, Female Liberation as the Basis for Social Revolution, in
SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL 477 (Robin Morgan ed. 1970); Redstockings Manifesto, in SISTERHOOD IS
POWERFUL, supra at 533; FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1963); SIMONE DE
BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1949).
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domination, and certain forms of collective consciousness. Every ideology
is a product of the underlying material conditions of the social collectivity
in question, and the corresponding relations of domination. Any attempt to
change ideology must start with changing these relations of domination.
And since these relations are always material, any attempt to change
ideology must inevitably begin by addressing the question of material social
change.
An understanding of ideology in this sense requires study of not only the
corresponding system of values and beliefs—the worldview at the center of
the respective collective consciousness—but also the dialectical
relationship between this system of values and beliefs and the underlying
social materiality. The focus of the critical inquiry falls on the background
system of power relations by which these frameworks are produced, but
also on the process of co-production or mutual constitution between these
background systems and the ideational frameworks which give them cover.
From this perspective on ideological formation and power, “unmasking”
a given discourse as “ideologically biased” is hardly the ballgame. Indeed,
without changes in the underlying system of material social relations,
unmasking ideology only does so much. This raises the question of strategy,
for how can the underlying system of material social relations be changed?
One classical answer from the Marxist tradition was Leninism: liberation
can only come “from without,” thanks to the leadership of the “vanguard
party.”150 This meant empowering a select group of radical activists who,
through their revolutionary leadership, would shake up society so
vigorously that the proverbial sleeping masses would be forced to finally
arise. Another classical answer came from the various Frankfurt School-
inspired movements, such as the New Left and democratic socialists.151
Rather than focus on a vanguard party, the Left needed to organize
something along the lines of a continual consciousness raising campaign.
This would induce a process of regular grassroots discussions, shared
experiences, and localized activism “from below.” What was needed was
an increase in popular awareness about the existing system of domination
and injustice, which in turn could strengthen the sense of solidarity across
the different sectors of the society, enabling those sleepy masses to get on
with it already. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is the latter model of social change
that has proved more popular among academic intelligentsias. Indeed, the
general political attitude of the socio-legal critique has been unmistakably
Frankfurtist: for the socialist revolution to stand any chance of success, the
150. See, most famously, 5 V. I. LENIN, What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement, in
COLLECTED WORKS 347 (1977). See also Alan Shandro, Lenin and Marxism: Class Struggle, The
Theory of Politics and the Politics of Theory, in TWENTIETH-CENTURY MARXISM: A GLOBAL
INTRODUCTION, supra note 18, at 15.
151. See generally DICK HOWARD, THE MARXIAN LEGACY: THE SEARCH FOR THE NEW LEFT (2019);
HERBERT MARCUSE, THE NEW LEFT AND THE 1960S (Douglas Kellner ed. 2005).
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idea of its necessity must be consciously realized by the liberated masses.152
Compared to the first two Critiques, with their broad characterization of
ideology as politically-motivated-lying, what we are seeing here in the
foundations of the Third Critique is a reduction in importance attributed to
the classical liberal idea of personal agency, along with those broader
themes of intentional manipulation and instrumentalism. To be sure,
ideology in the terrain of the Third Critique is deeply associated with
phenomena like legitimation, mystification, and obfuscation. But these
processes are now understood to be much more global in scope than when
they were initially developed by Marx, and so beyond the immediate control
of any one individual. For what holds true for ideology, holds true also for
liberation: what is needed to put an end to any given regime of
mystification, obfuscation, and legitimation is an organized process of
resistance spread over a protracted period of time, not just a few individual
bursts of brilliant rhetoric.
No less importantly, the Marxist tradition also adopts a much more
complex and nuanced theory of language. Rather than viewing it as a mere
medium of ideology, the Marxist tradition tends to consider language itself
an inevitable target and product of the broader ideological process which
both exceeds it and remains analytically prior to it. The reign of bourgeois
ideology, argue Marxist theorists, does not just misrepresent to the working
class the true reality of its oppression. It prevents workers from even finding
the right words and categories in which to articulate their lived experience
and history of this oppression.153 To use a vocabulary is to already accept
that vocabulary’s evaluative assumptions and the power structures by which
they are generated. And yet, even as language is ideologically corruptible,
the Marxist tradition still reaffirmed a belief in truth and the possibility of a
clear-eyed description of it. Which leads one to ask, how is it possible for
us to know for sure that what we know – about ourselves, our ideas, and the
world around us – is objectively true if even the most fundamental
categories of our thought are susceptible to ideological influence?
The answer, of course, was dialectics. By relating our consciousness to
the whole of society, writes Georg Lukacs, “it becomes possible to infer the
thoughts and feelings which [we] would have in a particular situation if [we]
were able to assess it [in a way] appropriate to [our] objective situation.”154
152. See HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 44 (2002).
153. See LUKACS, supra note 148, at 49-50, 89-90; LOUIS ALTHUSSER, ESSAYS IN SELF-CRITICISM 55
(1976). A similar understanding of the essential non-neutrality of language is found in much
contemporary feminist discourse. The very terms in which we are meant to process our experiences and
understand ourselves and others around us, argues feminist theory, are a product of centuries-long
systems of patriarchal domination. Words and categories that purportedly represent qualities associated
with one gender have been consistently infused with positive connotations, while those representing
others have gone in the opposite direction. See DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 149, at 260-9; Bonnie Kreps,
Radical Feminism I, in RADICAL FEMINISM 234 (Anne Koedt et al. eds. 1973).
154. LUKACS, supra note 148, at 51.
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Note the logic of the underlying argument: Classical Marxism is drawn to
the hermeneutics of suspicion, and portrays ideology as a decidedly
distortive and mystificatory process. But it also presumes the existence of a
discoverable truth-horizon. Hence, the idea that ideological consciousness
is necessarily a form of false consciousness. Hence, also, the general
emphasis on the importance of identifying, elaborating, and perfecting the
various emancipatory knowledge strategies to be used in the cause of
consciousness-raising.
In the classical Marxist tradition, the most effective knowledge strategy
is that of “dialectical materialism.”155 Like empiricism and positivist social
science in the liberal tradition, for the Marxist dialectical materialism gives
the analyst that old touch of magic. It enables its users not only to escape
the prison-house of ideological superstition, but also to pierce beneath the
deceptive appearances even of their own personal experiences. Consider,
for example, the parallels between Lukacs’s apologia for the dialectical
method and the earlier quoted passage from Galbraith about the
“forbidding” character of economic and social forms:
the actual make-up of social phenomena is not immediately apparent
[because of] the conditions of existence of capitalist society. It seems
obvious to the people who live in capitalist society, indeed it strikes
them as ‘natural’, to stick with these forms and to strive to fathom the
more hidden interconnections . . . through which these phenomena
interconnect in reality.156
But whereas the bourgeoisie can afford to ignore these “hidden
interconnections” and thus remain permanently “enmeshed” in the
immediacy of its life experiences, for the proletariat it is “a matter of life
and death.”157 To break the ideological hold, we must encounter the entire
totality of social life as a whole. And the only way to do that is by the lights
of dialectical materialism.158 That said, what makes ideological
consciousness false is not so much the fact that what the reigning ideology
teaches us to believe as real and true are actually illusions. It is rather that
ideology produces an image of the world that systematically disorients and
demobilizes the effort to revolutionize the status quo. As Denise Thompson
explains, whether any particular ideological pronouncement seems true or
false is not really the issue: what matters is “whether the meanings which
structure people’s lives . . . can be used to challenge or undermine
domination.”159 Or, as Eagleton puts it:
155. SeeV. ADORATSKY, DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM: THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF MARXISM-
LENINISM (1977); LOUIS ALTHUSSER, FOR MARX 161-218 (1969).
156. GEORG LUKACS, A DEFENCE OFHISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 79-80 (2000).
157. LUKACS, supra note 148, at 164-5.
158. Id. at 169-70.
159. THOMPSON, supra note 149, at 29.
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the falsehood at stake here is a matter of self-deception, not of getting
the world wrong. There is no reason to suppose that the surface belief
necessarily involves empirical falsity, or is in any sense “unreal.”
Someone may really love animals, while being unaware that his benign
authority over them compensates for a lack of power within the labor
process.160
The reason why this point deserves our attention is twofold. In the first
place, it highlights how ideology functions as a mechanism of power by
way of rationalization. When ideology rationalizes our lived experiences to
us, it not only infuses them with “systematic meanings,” but also makes
them “palatable or acceptable, real and unchallengeable.”161 Second is the
idea that we know only two basic modes of existence: “sleeping and
waking, dreaming and [reality].”162 As the English psychoanalyst Adam
Phillips explains, the more we can make sense of the former, the more
somehow we can learn something important about ourselves.163
B. Law, Society, and the Critique of Ideology
In the mid-1980s, scholars like Roger Cotterrell and Alan Hunt were
serving up law and society frameworks derived from many of these Marxist
and post-Marxist themes.164 In The Sociology of Law, Cotterrell examined
how law fashioned certain power dynamics in society, arriving at the
conclusion that “[l]egal ideology can be thought of not as legal doctrine
itself but as the forms of social consciousness reflected in and expressed
through legal doctrine.”165 That is to say, the workings of legal ideology
express themselves less in the rules of law that are created in the positive
legal order than in the way people come to think about authority and
equality in social life. The ideology of law is a system of field-specific
160. EAGLETON, supra note 128, at 89.
161. THOMPSON, supra note 149, at 22.
162. ADAM PHILLIPS, SIDE EFFECTS 109 (2006).
163. Id. at 113. The fundamental premise behind the concept of psychoanalysis, notes Freud, is the idea
that all our dreams are essentially a reaction to some underlying physical stimuli acting upon us during
our sleep. SIGMUND FREUD, INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 64 (n.d.) [1917]. It is
the unique power of the analyst to understand the logic of this reaction and to decode on that basis the
“hidden reality” behind our dreams. Note the basic parallels between the Marxist idea of ideology-
critique and the Freudian concept of psychoanalysis. What the analysis and the dream are to Freud,
society and its ideology are to Marxism. The critic is the analyst and every act of critique aims to decode
what specific material stimuli may have triggered the ideological sleep in question. Note also the
essential rationalism and determinism of the underlying theoretical sensibilities. Both the Freudian
concept of dreams and the classical Marxist concept of ideology as false consciousness implicitly
presume not only the existence of some “true reality” behind the dream / ideology but also the possibility
of uncovering this reality through the exercise of rational inquiry and analytical rigor. Furthermore, just
as dreams in Freud are not just random illusions but a “mode of reaction of the mind to stimuli acting
upon it during sleep,” so too ideologies, in classical Marxism, are not at all arbitrary either in form or in
content, since their structure and logic are always determined by the respective economic and social
realities. Id.
164. Cotterrell, supra note 42, at 141.
165. Id. at 122.
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collective consciousness that functions to limit the bounds of what legal
subjects and decision-makers perceive to be reasonable disagreements
about how to organize society. The reason for this, explains Cotterrell, lies
in the fact that ideology “provides the [basic] framework of thought within
which individuals and social groups interpret the nature of the conflicts in
which they are involved and recognize and understand the interests which
they seek to promote.”166
A central feature of this ideological framework is the idea that a just
society is predicated on a law of individual rights.167 Indeed, “the legal
person or legal subject — the being recognized by the law as the locus of
rights and duties — is . . . the foundation, in a sense, of all legal ideology.”168
The reality behind this, of course, is that such a “being” is nothing more
than an abstract construct. But in deciding to ground the entirety of law’s
imaginary in this construct, a bourgeois legal system not only actively
reifies the individual, converting it in the process into a political fetish but
also uses this fetish to reconstitute institutions and practices in ways that
disempower and demobilize those forces that otherwise might seek to
challenge the political and economic status quo. Law is not just “as a policy
instrument acting on society” from without, but as a site of social
constitution—the mechanism of its dialectical becoming—a reality that
exists both as a fact and as a belief, “as normative ideas embedded in social
practices.”169
The endorsement of the classical Marxist tradition took an even stronger
turn in Hunt’s work. The first thing that needs to be noted about the Marxist
critique of ideology, observed Hunt, was that through its insight into the
dialectics between consciousness and becoming, Marxism held the promise
of “advanc[ing] the explanatory power of social theory in its application to
the analysis of law.”170 Like with Cotterrell, Hunt’s argument led him
eventually to the idea that any truly realistic inquiry into law’s role in
society should learn to see “law not merely as an external mechanism of
regulation but as a constituent of the way in which social relations are lived
and experienced.”171 What comes from this argument, however, is an even
more explicit endorsement of a “materialist” methodology: rather than
targeting “the smooth surface of legal reasoning and judicial utterance,” the
166. Id. at 121.
167. Id. at 125.
168. Id. at 130-131.
169. Roger Cotterrell, Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A View of Sociolegal Studies, 29 J.
L. & SOC’Y 632, 640 (2002).
170. Hunt, supra note 138, at 11.
171. Id. at 15 (“This approach radically changes the role accorded ideology in social life. Ideology is
perceived not as a form of consciousness, which is the conventional view, but as a constituent of the
unconscious in which social relations are lived. Once this possibility is appreciated, we have in ideology
a new and powerful tool for exploring the relationship between ‘the Law,’ legal subjects, and social
relations.”).
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object of legal ideology-critique should be the analysis of those social,
economic, and political struggles that reside behind and are obscured by
those appearances.172 Note the implied distinction between discursive
frameworks and practice: though the two are closely related, it is in the
space of these background legal practices, where the subjects of law
experience it as a lived social reality, that law’s ideology really exerts its
influence on society.173 A study of the discursive output of courts and
legislatures can give us a good idea of how the legal system ultimately
“wants” its subjects to experience themselves at the level of abstract ideal.
But it is in studying the everyday legal practices that we can encounter the
true materiality of the law—that is to say, law’s real impact on real people
and real relations.174 If we are to properly avoid “idealistic theories of
ideological determination,” Hunt concludes, socio-legal critique must aim
to uncover those social practices “suffused” by legal ideologies.175
Of course, the thrust of this critique was often understood as simply
suggesting that law was just cover for politics, and the ultimate aim was to
dig out this hidden politics, to get an empirical handle on what was “really
going on” beneath all the abstract constructs and discursive
misrepresentations.176 Seen from this angle, the main defining feature of
what was becoming the Third Critique, as Austin Sarat and Susan Silbey
once put it, was that it would “refuse to be deceived.”177 And yet what made
the work of scholars like Cotterrell and Hunt so noteworthy, and so
“postmodern,” was that there was also something very different about the
way it understood the idea of “deception.” Unlike earlier iterations of the
law and society movement, Cotterrell, Hunt, and those scholars—like Sarat
and Silbey—who came together under the banner of the Amherst Seminar
on Legal Ideology and Legal Process, rejected theoretical frameworks in
which “Law” and “Politics”—or Law and Society for that matter—would
be seen as separate and mutually autonomous spheres. It was a mistake,
according to this approach, to view these domains as monolithic,
homogenous blocks.178 Both Law and Society were fictions, while laws and
172. Id. at 16.
173. Id. at 15-16.
174. Id. at 26.
175. Id.
176. David Trubek & Jon Esser, Critical Empiricism in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program, or
Pandora’s Box, 14 L. & SOC. INQ. 3, 10 (1989).
177. Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat, Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research, 21 L. & SOC. REV.
165, 166 (1987). Among others, Sarat and Silbey explained in the introduction to a symposium issue on
Law and Ideology that research moving in the law and society version of the second critique had certain
intellectual prerequisites: (1) linkages between consciousness and social relations; (2) understanding
law as social practice; (3) law as a medium of Foucauldian power dynamics; (4) particularized historical
contingency and complexity. 22 L. & SOC. REV. 629 (1988).
178. See also Hunt, supra note 138, at 28. Still, Hunt did rely on a distinction between internal
contradictions plaguing law and external contradictions in society. Id. at 29. The idea was that they
needed to be studied together. Id. at 31.
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social relations were real enough; the trick in moving forward was to
emphasize “particularity and specificity,” to celebrate the idiosyncratic, the
complex, the local universes of law and politics and economics and culture
in their necessary blendings.179 To make good on the ideological critique of
power, Sarat and Silbey concluded,
[t]he risk has to be taken and the courage has to be mustered to immerse
ourselves in the study of social transactions and social processes. If we
take as our subject the constitutive effect of law we cannot be content
with literary theory applied to legal doctrine. We must instead study
families, schools, work places, social movements, and yes, even
professional associations to present a broad picture in which law may
seem at first glance virtually invisible . . . We would then understand
law not as something removed from social life, occasionally operating
upon and struggling to regulate and shape social forms, but as fused
with and thus inseparable from all the activities of living and
knowing.180
Work on the socio-legal critique of ideology continued through the ‘80s
and into the 1990s, much of it hovering in and around what Bruno Latour
called the hybrid and Pierre Schlag would later call the dedifferentiation
problem: the hunt for and analysis of the everyday mixtures of the legal and
the social.181 Despite the concessions made in the face of the complex
networks of law and politics, the socio-legal tradition practiced by the likes
of Hunt, Silbey, and Sarat still believed in the epistemic potential of social
sciences to cure ideology. As David Trubek suggested, these scholars
assume that social scientists are able to use standard social science
methods to provide valid descriptions of the historical and contingent
practices the new paradigm identifies. Moreover, the very discovery of
historicity and contingency makes “social science” all the more
important to law’s understanding of itself. Since, in this approach, the
true meaning and impact of law lies in complex and contingent
practices often of exceedingly low visibility, the work of social
scientists . . . becomes essential if we are to understand what is really
going on.182
Silbey, however, warned against taking Trubek’s criticism too seriously.
Law and society scholars, she counseled, needed to stop using the categories
of law as categories of social analysis:
[w]e were using our subject’s language as the tools for our analysis and
in the course finding ourselves unable to answer the questions our
179. Silbey & Sarat, Critical Traditions, supra note 177, at 173.
180. Id.
181. Susan Silbey & Patricia Ewick, The Architecture of Authority: The Place of Law in the Space of
Science, in The Place of Law, in THE PLACE OF LAW (Austin Sarat et. al. eds., 2003).
182. Trubek & Esser, Critical Empiricism, supra note 176, at 25, 34.
52
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol31/iss2/9
2021] Deep Cuts 487
research generated. New theoretical materials and research methods
were necessary. These involved more intense study of local cultures,
native texts, and interpretive hermeneutical techniques for inhabiting
and representing everyday worlds to construct better accounts of how
law works.183
From here on out, Silbey argued, the post-positivist, post-empiricist
socio-legal critique needed to search out “alternative understandings and
accounts of social relations, alternative constructions forged from divergent
experiences and competing visions.”184
As the work of the Amherst Seminar pushed its way toward the twenty-
first century, legal ideology continued to mean the ideology of legal practice
as manifested in law’s external, social life. To be sure, scholars like John
Brigham, Christine Harrington, Barbara Yngvesson, Austin Sarat, and
Susan Silbey argued for a far more complicated take on the sociologist’s
role in producing empirical work. Their approach, all agreed, was no mere
duplication of what the political scientists were doing in their studies of law
and ideology. As Sarat explained, “[p]articipants in the Seminar are
struggling to do empirical work in a world stripped of a self-confident belief
in the distinction between subjects and objects and between ways of
representing the world and the world that is represented. We recognize that
even in such a world we still need standards for evaluating what we read
and what we learn.”185 That is, if Sarat and his associates felt that it was
impossible to make claims about the “true” nature of law’s ideological
manifestations because of the utterly complex relation between the scientist
and the object, this did not mean that sociologists had nothing useful to say.
As Sarat and Sibley put it, “surely the import of contemporary theory is not
that there is no ‘there’ out there but rather that our ability to know what is
there is limited.”186 Fair enough. For as so many postmodern thinkers were
arguing at the time, the capacity to represent in the mind what was
happening in the world was illusion, plain and simple.187
For the proponents of the socio-legal critique, however, it was all so very
complicated. As Silbey explained,
[w]hile critique seeks to explore social practices and to identify the
structures of subordination in order to engage them for liberatory
purposes, it must not, however, submerge fractured identities and
multiple experiences in an effort to create a unitary account of social
life. Rather, I argue that the authority of accounts produced by
183. Susan Silbey, Loyalty and Betrayal: Cotterrell’s Discovery and Reproduction of Legal Ideology,
16, L. & SOC. INQ. 809, 817 (1991).
184. Id.
185. Austin Sarat, Off to Meet the Wizard: Beyond Validity and Reliability in the Search for a Post-
Empiricist Sociology of Law, 15 L. & SOC. INQ. 155, 160-161 (1990).
186. Silbey & Sarat, Critical Traditions, supra note 177, at 168.
187. See, e.g. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
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sociology will depend on the ability to construct reports that sustain
multiple perspectives; at the time same time, sociology’s contribution
to social critique will also depend on its ability to locate those accounts
within historical and political analyses that provide the context that
gives them purpose and meaning.188
In the pursuit of a legal ideology, postmodern socio-legal scholarship
ended up delivering an account of just about everything. The ideology of
legal practice was also the ideology of cultural practice, since “legality
refers to ‘the meanings, sources of authority, and cultural practices that are
recognized as legal, regardless of who employs them or for what ends.’”189
Legal ideology, as a result, had to be understood as virtually omnipresent,
dispersed in the everyday habits of legal professionals as much as their
clients, legal academics as much as the lay public. To find its traces one had
to look “not only in courtrooms, prisons, and law offices, but [also] in
hospitals, bedrooms, schoolrooms, in theaters, and films and novels.”190
Having begun as an exercise in adapting the Marxian traditions of false
consciousness to the study of the positive legal system, the Third Critique
expanded its scope of attention to cover “the relations of identity and
consciousness, social construction and constitutive labyrinths, an
indeterminacy marked by historicity, and the unfolding of power in its
myriad forms and sites.”191 Of course, the analysis of these cultural
labyrinths was expected to complement, not water down, the analysis of
domination and subordination.192 But, when all was said and done, the
question inevitably arose: in what sense could the theoretical project that
emerged out of all this still be described accurately as a study of legal
ideologies?193
As the project matured, Silbey and Ewick commented that ideology was
neither just a “grand set of ideas that in its seamless coherence precludes all
competing ideas,”194 nor just a proxy for an individual’s perspective on
particular policy choices.
Construed as a process, ideology shapes social life, not because it
prevents thinking . . . but because it actually invites thinking. Ideology
derives from and reflects back upon shared experiences, particularly
those of power; it is inextricably tied to practical consciousness.
188. Silbey, Loyalty, supra note 183, at 814-815.
189. Susan Silbey, Everyday Life and the Constitution of Legality, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE
SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE 336 (Mark Jacobs & Nancy Hanrahan, eds., 2005).
190. Carroll Seron & Susan Silbey, Profession, Science and Culture, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO
LAW AND SOCIETY 50 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004).
191. Id. at 51.
192. Id.
193. See generally, Aletta Norval, Poststructuralist Conceptions of Ideology, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES (Michael Freeden & Marc Steers, eds., 2013).
194. Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, Common Knowledge and Ideological Critique: The Significance
of Knowing that the Haves Come Out Ahead, 33 L. & SOC. REV. 1025, 1036 (1999).
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Defined as a form of sense making that embeds power, ideology has to
be lived, worked out, and worked on. It has to be invoked and applied
and challenged. People have to use it to make sense of their lives. It is
only through that sense making that people produce not only those
lives but the specific structures and contests for power within which
they live. The internal contradictions, oppositions, and gaps are not
weaknesses in the ideological cloth. On the contrary, an ideology is
sustainable only through such internal contradictions insofar as they
become the basis for the invocations, reworkings, applications, and
transpositions through which ideologies are enacted in everyday life.195
To be sure, back in the 1980s Hunt had already anticipated and applauded
the pluralism that would come to attend the socio-legal analysis of legal
ideology. Nevertheless, as Hunt and Trevor Purvis argued in 1993, the
concept of ideology was already getting swallowed up by the more
prevalent concept of discourse.196 By the first decades of the new century,
in the context of the socio-legal critique, the triumph of discourse over
ideology was all but complete.197 The search for “ideology,” at least as the
term was understood by leftists in the ‘70s and ‘80s, was out of fashion.198
Before turning to the Fourth Critique, let us restate. Like the first two
Critiques, the Third Critique of postmodern socio-legal studies relies on a
distinction between an internal Law and an externalized Society, keeping in
mind that the distinction has become extraordinarily complicated.
Nevertheless, as complicated as the distinction is, it remains. To understand
the “reality” of “Law”—and yes, we now requires scare quotes—Law must
be placed in its social context. As a result, what socio-legal scholars and
empirical legal studies people have in common here is precisely an effort to
measure ideology as it manifests “beyond” the “pure” domain of
jurisprudence. Or, to put that another way, there is a deep consensus
between all three Critiques about sophisticated empirical knowledge
(whether “post” or not) as the cure for ideology in law. Another point of
agreement between the three Critiques concerns the location of ideology. In
each case, the “mandarin materials” of legal argumentation are always a red
herring. Legal doctrines and legal reasoning—this is most certainly not
where the action’s at. To be sure, legal rules are important enough, but they
are only the very tip of the ideological iceberg. And the techniques of legal
reasoning—of what ideological import is that? For purveyors of the first
three Critiques, it was next to nothing. For the Fourth Critique discussed
below, however, the patterns of judicial reasoning are themselves a
legitimating ideology. As Duncan Kennedy would suggest, echoing
195. Id. at 1036-1037.
196. Purvis & Hunt, supra note 141.
197. TEUN VAN DIJK, IDEOLOGY AND DISCOURSE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION (2000).
198. See generally, ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT: ANOTHER TIME, A
GREATER TASK (2015).
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Althusser and in contrast with the socio-legal scholars, patterns of legal
justification “form one of the ideological state apparatuses.”199
V. FOURTH CRITIQUE: LEGAL STRUCTURALISM AND THE CRITIQUE OF
LEGAL THOUGHT
The Fourth Critique is that of legal structuralism, an approach primarily
associated with early U.S. critical legal studies (“CLS”).200 Critical legal
studies (which, to be sure, is a broader family of ideas than legal
structuralism) is typically pinned to the idea of legal indeterminacy and a
handful of slogans like “rights are bad,” “legal reasoning is a sham,” and
“law is politics.”201 Like so many bumper stickers, however, these phrases
are of little use, borrowed in turn from the broader catalogue of the legal
realist tradition,202 or from the classical Marxist critique of the reifying
effects of bourgeois individualism.203 Nor does the confluence of these ideas
emerge as particularly coherent or intelligible as a statement of what CLS
might have been all about. For if law is indeterminate, why is law also
necessarily political? If all legal reasoning is vulnerable to relentless abuse,
why would the particular domain of “rights talk” get so much of the bad
press?
Indeed, given these apparent hints of realism and Marxism one could be
forgiven for presuming that legal structuralism might provide little more
than a continuation of each of the other three Critiques. Like functionalism,
this Fourth Critique uncovers political ideas inscribed both within the
conventional legal discourse and in the socio-economic context “behind” it.
Like ELS, the structuralist critique acknowledges the importance of
personal politics in judicial decision-making, as well as the need to expose
the bad faith of partisan projects pursued by legal elites in the medium of
legal reasoning. Like socio-legal studies, legal structuralism recognizes the
mutually constitutive dynamic between law and society and the irreducibly
collective character of ideological consciousness. That said, and as we
discuss below, the Fourth Critique is a different cut.
199. KENNEDY, supra note 36, at 282.
200. Or, as Mark Tushnet once called it, “critical legal theory (without modifiers).” Mark Tushnet,
Critical Legal Theory (without Modifiers) in the United States, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 99 (2005). On the
intellectual genealogy of the CLS tradition, see Akbar Rasulov, CLS and Marxism: A History of an
Affair, 5 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 622 (2014); DESAUTELS-STEIN, supra note 47, at 35-70.
Legal structuralism also enjoys meaningful connections with feminist legal scholarship and critical race
theory. See, e.g., HALLEY, supra note 43; Olsen, supra note 43; Joanne Conaghan, Reassessing the
Feminist Theoretical Project in Law, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 351 (2000); IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW
(1996).
201. See, e.g.LLOYD’S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 935-950 (M.D.A. Freeman ed., 6th ed. 1994);
J.G. RIDDALL, JURISPRUDENCE 254-69 (2005). See also Michael Fischl, The Question that Killed
Critical Legal Studies, 17 L. & SOC. INQ. 779 (1992).
202. Llewellyn’s work on the canons of statutes readily comes to mind. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 521-535 (1960).
203. See, e.g. EVGENY PASHUKANIS, SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW 54-61, 77-89 (1980).
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A. Althusser and Saussure
The most defining trait of legal structuralism is neither a commitment to
the idea of legal indeterminacy, nor a thesis that law is politics. Rather, it is
the recruitment of the structuralist conception of ideology as a semiotic
system. The logic behind this concept of ideology is displayed in the
following comment from the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser,
in his 1965 essay “Marxism and Humanism”:
It is customary to suggest that ideology belongs to the region of
“consciousness.” We must not be misled by this appellation which is
still contaminated by the idealist problematic that preceded Marx. In
truth, ideology has very little to do with “consciousness” [but] is
profoundly unconscious. [It] is . . . a system of representations, but in
the majority of cases these representations have nothing to do with
“consciousness”: they are usually images and occasionally concepts,
but it is above all as structures that they impose on the vast majority of
men [who] live their actions . . . in ideology, by and through ideology.
[Every] “lived” relation between men and the world, including
History . . . passes through ideology . . . This is the sense in which
Marx said that it is in the ideology . . . that men become conscious of
their place in the world and in history, as it is within this ideological
unconsciousness that men succeed in altering their “lived” relations
between them and the world and acquiring that new form of specific
unconsciousness called “consciousness”.204
Note the four stages in Althusser’s argument: (i) Ideology is not so much
a form of collective consciousness (as suggested in the Third Critique), as
it is a form of collective unconsciousness; (ii) ideology “governs” by
structuring a subject’s ability to process her lived reality, but not only by
delivering to its subjects certain specific beliefs, presumptions, and values;
(iii) whatever we can think and know about the world, history, and our place
in either, we can only think and know “within ideology”—there simply is
no non-ideological way of processing lived experience; (iv) consciousness
itself—and this includes “raised consciousness” and “enlightened
consciousness” too—is also a species of ideology.
Two points which we wish to glean from this opening: (i) the inevitably
partisan character of knowledge205 and (ii) the relation between Saussurean
semiology and ideology. Both ideas are vital to legal structuralism. First,
Althusser’s model of ideology, similar to what we have seen in the first
three Critiques, is sympathetic to the argument that all ideology is
essentially a projection of bias. That is, ideology always has a motivational
function, inducing people to support certain causes over others, reject
204. ALTHUSSER, supra note 155, at 232-33.
205. See, e.g., LOUIS ALTHUSSER, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 64-68 (Ben Brewster,
trans., NYU Press 2001).
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certain outcomes, and adopt other behaviors or attitudes. Althusser’s
explanation differs, however, in that it decouples its concept of ideology
from the concept of “truth,” insisting on the absolute impossibility of
“impartial” or “objective” knowledge. By arguing that all forms of
consciousness are inescapably ideological, Althusser claims there can be no
consciousness structure that is not always-already biased, or, as Althusser’s
student Michel Foucault would later say, knowledge is never innocent of
the will to dominance.206 Althusser also observed that there was little
separating “false” from “true” consciousness, and the idea of the grand
“sleep of reason,” so central to classical Marxism, was just wrong. All
consciousness is ideological, even the Marxist one.207 There are no
knowledge systems that are free of ideology. All ideologies, by definition,
are distortive—not in the sense that they misrepresent some hidden “real
truth” about the underlying material realities of social life, but in the way
that they construct actual lived experiences.208 There is no way to break out
of ideology—not so much because every aspect of social life is deeply
politicized, but because it is impossible to find any kind of meaning or
intelligibility outside the plane of ideology. Some years later, another
student of Althusser’s, Jacques Derrida, would repackage the latter insight
as the slogan “il n’y a pas de hors-texte,”209 meaning “there is no extra-
textual domain accessible to us as human subjects.”210 But the essential
point was already there with Althusser: ideology is the only world we can
live in. If we wish to make sense of our experiences, we have no choice but
to make use of one or another ideological framework.
Along with Marx, one of Althusser’s central reference points in
“Marxism and Humanism” was the high structuralist tradition of Claude
Levi-Strauss and Jacques Lacan.211 The latter in particular was a powerful
background influence, for Lacan had made his name in the broader French
intellectual scene. Lacan proposed two revolutionary theses,212 the first of
which was the idea that the Freudian unconscious was ontologically
206. MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 131-33 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans.,
Pantheon Books 1980).
207. Marxist science, being the worldview of the proletariat struggling for universal emancipation,
aspires, in the last instance, towards equipping the working class with the necessary analytical tools and
theoretical resources to effect the transition to a classless society (communism). And yet even in the
classless society, Althusser notes, the role of ideology remains ‘indispensable.’ ALTHUSSER, supra note
155, at 235-36.
208. ALTHUSSER, supra note 205, at 165.
209. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158 (1997).
210. Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique, 22 CARDOZO L REV. 1147, 1182 n.99 (2001).
211. For more on the structuralist tradition, see TERENCE HAWKES, STRUCTURALISM AND SEMIOTICS
(2003); FRANÇOIS DOSSE, HISTORY OF STRUCTURALISM (1998); JONATHAN CULLER, STRUCTURALIST
POETICS (1975).
212. Lacan’s rise to fame came in no small part thanks to Althusser. See DOSSE, supra note 211, at 291-
92.
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“transindividual.”213 Rather than an emanation of the personal features and
characteristics of the particular subject in question, the unconscious was
actually a product of a greater “Symbolic Order,” by which Lacan
essentially meant all “those . . . rules which govern . . . human interchange”
from simple behavioral conventions to the more complex practices of
kinship and marriage.214 The second claim was the idea that the Freudian
unconscious, in addition to being trans-individual, was also “structured . . .
like a language” in the sense that it operated according to “the same laws as
those discovered in the study of actual languages.”215 As a long-term
devotee of Levi-Strauss, Lacan associated this linguistic study with the
Saussurean structuralist tradition.216
The continuity between Lacan’s concept of the unconscious and
Althusser’s theory of ideology would have been unmistakable to most of
Althusser’s readers. Like Lacan’s unconscious, Althusser’s ideology is
defined as the product of socially imposed conventions and material
practices,217 as opposed to consciously articulated discourses (unspeak) or
mental representations (ideas). Like Lacan’s conception of the unconscious,
Althusser’s conception of ideology governs subjects as much through its
structuring effects as through its normative content. Like Lacan’s
unconscious, Althusser’s ideology is assumed to be beyond the reach of its
subjects—not just because they are not sufficiently “awake” or
“empowered” to become conscious of ideological influence, but also
because we only develop social consciousness through our immersion in
ideology. Just as Lacan’s theory identified the principal function of the
unconscious as “regulat[ing] the formation of every subject,”218 so in
Althusser’s account the most important thing about ideology is its
interpellatory or subject-productive power. “[A]ll ideology has the
function . . . of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects.”219 It
performs this function by “hailing”—or interpellating—them through
discursive practices and social rituals, inducing them to move into and
assume precisely those subject-positions that the ideology in question
requires them to.220 Only to the extent to which we remain within some
ideological field do we retain the ability to become socially meaningful
213. “The unconscious is that part of the concrete discourse, in so far as it is transindividual, that is not
at the disposal of the subject in re-establishing the continuity of his conscious discourse.” JACQUES
LACAN, ÉCRITS 37 (2001). The original essay was published in 1956.
214. John Gasperoni, The Unconscious Is Structured Like a Language, 9 QUI PARLE 77, 80-81 (1996).
215. LACAN, supra note 213, at 179. The original essay was published in 1961.
216. On Lacan’s relationship with the Saussurean tradition and Levi-Strauss as its chief contemporary
exponent, see DOSSE, supra note 211, at 105-18.
217. All ideology has a material origin and a material existence. ALTHUSSER, supra note 205, at 165-
69.
218. Gasperoni, supra note 215, at 80.
219. ALTHUSSER, supra note 205, at 171.
220. Id. at 173-75.
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subjects. The ideology of interpellation may be more conciliatory towards
capitalism or more critical of it, more skeptical about legal formalism or
more favorable. Whatever the case, whether we side with the established
status quo or rise against it, we are already subjected to an ideological
“programming,” and the actual extent of critical self-reflectiveness and
personal agency we feel we can exercise in this process is also, ultimately,
an effect of the particular programming we received.
The late structuralist tradition was characterized far less by the traditional
hermeneutics of suspicion than by what its critics and proponents variously
characterized as a culture of “surface reading,”221 a back-door return to
“idealism and relativism,”222 “pessimistic or shamefaced
libertarian[ism],”223 and an attitude of defeatism “leading to critical
paralysis.”224 Ideology, it declared, was not only continuous and
omnipresent, but also insidious and inescapable, mundane and ubiquitous.
It operated at a level far below both the individual psyche and the collective
consciousness. It was distortive and politically charged. And whether or not
you liked the taste, you just had to swallow. Of course, there is always room
for maneuver within an ideology. But the takeaway here is that ideology
was the horizon of all meaning, all consciousness—even thought itself. It
might be possible to separate and resist the cruder segments of the
ideological reality, but short of going brain-dead, one simply could not
resist ideology tout court.225
Althusser predicted no possibility of an ideologically “uncontaminated”
knowledge that might emerge on the empirical horizon of meaning. Nor was
there any space for non-ideological subjectivity or identitarian categories
that were not always-already ideological and ideologized. Every subjective
persona one could assume was always going to be a product of (some kind
of) ideological interpellation. Rebels, mavericks, dropouts, and outlaws
could only exist and only be thinkable within those parameters that were
defined for them by some ideological framework or another. “The system
221. Toril Moi, “Nothing is Hidden”: From Confusion to Clarity, in CRITIQUE AND POST-CRTIQUE,
supra note 33, at 31, 33.
222. GREGORY ELLIOTT, ALTHUSSER: THE DETOUR OF THEORY 307 (2006).
223. EAGLETON, supra note 6, at 14.
224. JACQUELINE RHODES, RADICAL FEMINISM, WRITING, AND CRITICAL AGENCY 7 (2005).
225. “The popular stories told by people like John Mackey and Bill Gates,” wrote Nicole Aschoff,
are integral to capitalism, forming the basis of its spirits and providing a vehicle for ideology. . . . By
offering safe, market-friendly solutions to society’s problem, [they] reinforce the logic and structures of
accumulation. [These] stories set the terms of debate and the field of possibility, dominating the plane
of ideas and swallowing up stories that challenge the status quo. [B]ut this doesn’t mean that people
always believe [them] or are duped by their message.” NICOLE ASCHOFF, THE NEW PROPHETS OF
CAPITALISM 11-12 (2015). It might be possible to see through the biased narratives, the spin, the
unspeak, the misrepresentations, and in the event, to call them out, to challenge, to resist. But none of
that can unwind the ideological knot. “Ideology is much more subtle [than the simple proliferation of
these narratives]. It is not . . . something we can discover and remove from our field of vision . . .
Ideology is the world itself, inhabiting and structuring all the spaces in which we live and think. Id. at
12.
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[could] be disrupted, but not dismantled.”226 Only piecemeal resistance was
possible. “The future,” it followed, was simply “the present infinitely
repeated”: the same a la carte menu just with a broader set of options.227
Much of what we have summarized from Althusser, thus far, is
incompatible with the basic commitments of the First and Second Critiques.
It would be far less challenging, however, for certain proponents of the
Third Critique. Most notably, scholars like Silbey would find little in the
all-pervasive quality of Althusser’s ideology to disagree with. However, it
is with the turn to ideology as a semiotic structure that the Third and Fourth
Critiques most noticeably part ways. As will be recalled from above, the
second main idea in Althusser’s conception of ideology, and that Lacan
foregrounded in his discussion of the unconscious, was the idea that
ideologies are “sign systems” in the sense first elaborated by Ferdinand de
Saussure.
Saussure was a Swiss linguist whose posthumously published Course in
General Linguistics is widely considered today to be the founding text of
modern semiotics,228 and at the heart of Saussure’s general argument lay
three relatively complex ideas.229 The first was that signification gains
meaning through systems of differences: the capacity of any given construct,
image, act, or symbol to communicate meaning is predicated on the
possibility of it being reliably differentiated from all other similar
constructs, images, acts, and symbols. This requires the presence of a
certain pre-existing system in the context of which these constructs can be
ordered and organized. The name we may give to this system could be
paradigm, langue, or code. The actual labels matter less than the idea that
this system brings all of these different signifying elements into a single,
internally integrated whole, and in the last instance, the system provides the
ultimate guarantee of their intelligibility as meaning-carrying signifiers.
Saussure’s second move followed from the first. In the abstract, these
relationships of connection-through-differentiation that link the different
signifiers into a single system can be reduced, at the level of their
descriptive representation, to something that, in logical terms, looks very
much like a formal structure. A structure is a system of logical rules (if a,
226. EAGLETON, supra note 6, at 51.
227. Id. at 7. Note this last point: the substitution of a directional sense of history with one where history
is viewed as little more than a recombination of options may seem at first a relatively minor aspect of
the late structuralist tradition, but it was, in fact, one of its most important defining features. The idea of
movement as the process of “shifting” and “rearranging” a finite combinatory went straight to the very
foundations of the Saussurean paradigm. See Justin Desautels-Stein, After the End of Legal Thought, in
SEARCHING FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT (Justin Desautels-Stein & Christopher Tomlins,
eds., 2017).
228. FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (1983).
229. For a general overview and introduction to Saussure’s theory and its legacy for the structuralist
tradition, going down to Derrida and deconstructionists, see DOSSE, supra note 211, at 43-51; HAWKES,
supra note 211, at 8-16; JONATHAN CULLER, THE PURSUIT OF SIGNS 20-48 (2001). See generally,
FREDRIC JAMESON, THE PRISON-HOUSE OF LANGUAGE (1972).
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then b . . . ) that, like Ehrlich’s living law, manifests itself in practice only
through its functional effects and exists ontologically only as it is practiced.
The simplest structures recognizable from a Saussurean standpoint are the
basic binary oppositions that permeate most known human cultures:
raw/cooked, fresh/decayed, male/female, and the like.
A more complex example is a grammatical structure. This concept is used
in the Saussurean tradition both in the more common-sense meaning of
rules governing the use of language, and in the more abstract sense of
operative codes behind what the Soviet semiologist Juri Lotman called
“secondary modelling systems.”230 Literature, music, dress, photography,
ballet, diplomatic protocol—wherever we can find a transmission of
implicit or unspoken messages that go beyond the immediate content of the
respective language exchanges, we may find a corresponding operative
code or grammar.231
Bring the first and the second ideas together and what emerges is the third
idea, the Saussurean theory of meaning. Meaning, in this view, is always
understood to be “structural and relational rather than referential.”232 “No
sign makes sense on its own but only in relation to other signs.”233 Primacy
in analysis is given to the study of the relations between the respective
signifiers, not to their “inherent” qualities. Or in other words, the final
precondition of meaning production is the working ability of the agents to
combine and recombine the available semiotic materials. When we
communicate with one another, we don’t “speak our minds” or express
ourselves in a Platonic sovereign fashion. Rather, we send each other coded
signals by using commonly agreed upon signifiers, and the way we infuse
meaning into these signals is by arranging the signifiers into appropriate
combinations. Think of this as the equivalent of using notes and rests in
music notation or arranging letters and punctuation signs in alphabet-based
writing systems.
Note the caveat that all of this “commonly agreed upon.” According to
Saussure, signification is conventional as well as structural. Take, for
example, the particular shapes of letters in a given language. They must be
commonly recognizable if they are to have a power of signification. That is,
the combinatory in question must be sufficiently flexible and adaptable if it
is to transmit the kind of message the writer intends. At the same time, it
must also be sufficiently stable in order for the intended signification to
230. ”A primary modelling system is a code which cannot be traced back to other codes: human language
is an example. A secondary modelling system is a code which uses the elements of the primary system
in some special way. Among the secondary systems Lotman places art, religion, myth and a variety of
social mores and rituals.” Ewa Thompson, Russian Structuralist Theory, 49 BOOKS ABROAD 232, 233
(1975).
231. See SAUSSURE, supra note 228, at 16-17.
232. DANIEL CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS 18 (2007).
233. Id. at 18-19.
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become achievable.
To sum up, we have several ideas at the base of what will become the
Fourth Critique. (1) identity as an effect of ideology, (2) subject production
through discursive and material interpellation, (3) the ability to exercise
agency as a product of ideological programming, (4) meaning as
differentiation, (5) secondary modelling systems, and (6) the combinatory.
If we bring them together, the general outline of late structuralist (or
poststructuralist, depending on your emphases) thought comes into view.234
It was a way of thinking about consciousness and social reality that, starting
from the early 1970s, gradually displaced the Marxist-Freudian program
from its central position in critical theory.235 It was also what supplied the
Fourth Critique with its basic mode of operation.
B. The Structure of Legal Thought
From the vantage of legal structuralism, law was not only a distinct social
form or a body of normative constructs. It was a semiotic system, governed
234. See COLIN DAVIS, AFTER POSTSTRUCTURALISM (2003); CATHERINE BELSEY,
POSTSTRUCTURALISM (2002); Maria Golebiewska, Edmund Husserl’s Semantics and the Critical
Theses of Late Structuralism, 1 EIDOS 30 (2019).
235. Taking Althusser’s adaptation of Lacan to the next level, the late structuralist/poststructuralist
tradition over time dispensed with the old Marxist and Freudian vocabularies almost entirely. Receiving
an important boost in the mid- and late 1970s from Foucault, it drew over the course of the 1980s on a
wide range of influences reaching from Wittgenstein’s idea of “meaning as use” and Derrida’s concept
of deconstruction to Julia Kristeva’s theory of intertextuality and Stanley Fish’s theory of interpretive
communities, before culminating eventually, around the end of the Cold War in Judith Butler’s work on
gender performativity and the various neo- and post-Marxist versions of critical discourse analysis
developed by the likes of Fredric Jameson, Goran Therborn, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, and,
later, Slavoj Zizek. Foucault’s importance in this context, of course, comes not only from the fact that
he was Althusser’s one-time student. There exists, in fact, a direct line of continuity between Foucault’s
theory of disciplinary power and Althusser’s theory of ideology. See Walter Montag, “The Soul is the
Prison of the Body”: Althusser and Foucault, 1970-1975, in DEPOSITIONS: ALTHUSSER, BALIBAR,
MACHEREY AND THE LABOR OF READING 53 (Jacques Lezra ed., 1996). See generally LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 43 (1953). The concept of deconstruction is
notoriously elusive. A good starting point in Derrida’s own work can be found in JACQUES DERRIDA,
DISSEMINATION 4-6 (1981). For other scholars’ introduction to the concept, see, e.g., Jonathan Culler,
In Defence of Overinterpretation, in INTERPRETATION AND OVERINTERPRETATION 109, 120-3 (Stefan
Collini ed., 1992); Christopher Norris, Limited Think: How Not to Read Derrida, 20 DIACRITICS 16
(1990); DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY 49-51 (1990). See also JONATHAN
CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM (1982); TORIL MOI
(ED.), THE KRISTEVA READER 35-61 (1986). See generally STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS
CLASS? 147-73 (1980); Judith Butler, Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in
Phenomenology and Feminist Theory, 40 THEATRE JOURNAL 519 (1988). For Butler’s exploration of
the connections between her work and Althusser’s, see also Judith Butler, Conscience Doth Make
Subjects of Us All, in DEPOSITIONS: ALTHUSSER, BALIBAR, MACHEREY AND THE LABOR OF READING,
supra, at 6. See ERNESTO LACLAU AND CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY
(1985); Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Post-Marxism without Apologies, 166 NEW LEFT REV. 79
(1987). Laclau and Mouffe’s version of discourse analysis evolved later into the so-called Essex School,
for a typical introduction to which see Jules Townshend, Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: A
New Paradigm from the Essex School?, 5 BRIT. J. POL. & INT. REL. 129 (2003); GÖRAN THERBORN,
FROM MARXISM TO POST-MARXISM (2008); GÖRAN THERBORN, THE IDEOLOGY OF POWER AND THE
POWER OF IDEOLOGY (1980). See also DISCOURSE THEORY AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (David Howarth
et al. eds., 2000); SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE PARALLAX VIEW (2006); SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT
OF IDEOLOGY (1989).
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by its own operative grammar-code, possessed of its own combinatory that
allowed the articulation of a potentially endless number of competing
interpellatory and legitimational projects. The “content” of the grammar and
the lexicon impose limits on the sorts of personal politics and agendas one
could successfully bring into law. But these limits were no more
constraining than those of any physical medium:
you can’t do absolutely anything you want with a pile of bricks, and
what you can do depends on how many you have, as well as on your
other circumstances. [But] the medium doesn’t tell you what to do with
it—that you must make the bricks into a doghouse rather than into a
garden wall.236
At the same time, just because the jurist’s lexicon is relatively
indeterminate, it does not follow that the jurist can make any argument she
likes. Structural indeterminacy is not the same thing as random chaos.
Precisely because the structure leaves jurists discretionary space, there is
often the option to bring into our arguments a personal agenda or political
philosophy without stepping outside the boundaries of what would be
considered professionally admissible. “The judge,” as Duncan Kennedy
explained, “is neither free nor bound.”237 She is not a mechanical automaton
applying a law that somehow precedes her. Nor is she a disembodied mind
floating free of society. Every day she becomes a jurist, she does so as
someone who “ha[s], as part of [her] life as [she has] lived it up to this
moment, a set of intentions, a life-project as a judge, that will orient [her]
among the many possible” interpretative strategies she could develop in
relation to any given question.238
It is here that the two Althusserian themes resurface. First, there is a
reemphasized focus on the idea of personal agency, coupled with the
suggestion that agency is limited within the context of the legal system and
that these limits are, in fact, exactly what gives this system its specific
identity. Second, there is the concomitant argument that not only it is within
the jurist’s legal consciousness that the process of ideology lato sensu takes
place, but that it is also there that the possibility of ideological action
narrowly so construed is found. The limits of our professional
consciousness is what allow us to find the room for our personal politics.
Ideology is what interpellates us into jurists: judges, lawyers, legal
academics, whatever the case may be. Ideology is also the personal politics,
the worldviews, and the philosophies that we bring with us and implement,
within the constraints that the law’s grammar and lexicon give us, within
the medium of legal reasoning.
236. Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 518, 526 (1986).
237. Id. at 522.
238. Id. at 521.
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In his foundational work in the Fourth Critique, Duncan Kennedy has
theorized the dialogue between the Althusserian and the Mannheimian
concepts of ideology: ideology as the horizon of all meaning versus
ideology as a distinct legitimational project pursued by a particular cultural
elite or intelligentsia.239 In the present context, another way of summarizing
this distinction would be to call it the dialogue between the Lacanian version
of the Freudian unconscious and the functionalist and/or ELS version of
ideology as politicization of law. As Kennedy explained it, among the main
motivations behind legal structuralism’s recasting of the idea of ideology as
a two-level phenomenon was the desire
to reveal the large role played by the legal system [in the production of
the hierarchies and alienations of capitalism]; to deligitimate the
outcomes achieved through the legal system by exposing them as
political when they masquerade as neutral; to show that they are in
some sense unjust and their injustice contributes to the larger injustice
of the society as a whole; to be thereby, a radicalizing force on those
who read and accept the analysis; and to suggest ways that a
radicalizing project should approach the task of making the system less
unjust through political action.240
To return to some of the ideas already canvassed above, but placing them
now in this structuralist context, first among the legal structure’s ideological
formations is reification.241 As Lukacs described it, reification is a strategy
in which some larger social totality or unity is artificially broken up and
displaced.242 Reification can take place in any number of contexts, but if we
return to our Hayekian example from earlier, the “unity” would encompass
the jurist on the one hand, and the process of legal reasoning on the other.
For Hayek, legal reasoning is almost always detached from the will of the
239. KENNEDY, supra note 36, 41-2, 54-6. See also id. at 408, n.64. For the Mannheimian concept of
ideology, see generallyKARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (1979). Karl Klare provided an early
articulation as well in his critique of the essential structure of labor law. Klare argued that it was
grounded in the traditional liberal binaries of public/private, mandatory/permissive, political/economic,
state order/civil society that are, ultimately, combined in such a way as to “induc[e] workers to
participate in their own domination by managers and those whom managers serve.” At the same time,
within this structure there can also be found space for a far more concretized, less abstract-level
ideological dynamics: arguments and reform proposals that aim to entrench and legitimate or to unmask
and destabilize the specific political equilibria achieved by the ruling political and legal elites. This
second, narrower kind of ideology may be “articulated by . . . liberal theorists and [their] judicial
sponsors” or by critical labor law scholars and historians. Its object may be to “denude industrial
conflict . . . of political or class-based content and recast [it] as the struggle . . . over issues of economic
distribution,” or to show how this whole “frame of reference [is] untenable” and to “argue that collective
bargaining law . . . aims to legitimate . . . unnecessary and destructive hierarchy and domination in the
workplace.” The main thing to bear in mind, ultimately, is that it is only because and within the
parameters of the structural possibilities created by the former kind of ideological process that the latter
kind of ideological practice becomes conceivable. Karl Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New
Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L. J. 450, 461 (1981).
240. KENNEDY, supra note 36, at 280.
241. See Peter Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, in RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY (Stephen
Spitzer ed., 1980).
242. See generally, LUKACS, supra note 148.
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jurist, or at least, it is so detached if we have a healthy Rule of Law.243 In
Hayek’s vision of the Rule of Law, the jurist is little more than a vehicle for
a law that precedes him. The jurist’s means of argumentative production are
alienated or estranged from his individual will, who may very well desire
particular outcomes, but he resists these impulses in the effort to merely
discover and implement a legal order that is fundamentally autonomous
from juridical will. This estrangement between the jurist on the one side and
his argumentative means on the other is an example of reification: the
arguments are transformed into things over which the jurist is meant to have
little or no control. From the perspective of the Fourth Critique, however,
these “things” that have become alienated from the jurist’s will are best
understood as a unity of legal argument: the being as jurist and the practices
of legal argument are a totality, and to separate the two is to make an object
or a fetish out of the Rule of Law, instead of understanding the Rule of Law
to rather form a network of relations between human beings.
Fair enough, but why care if the separation of the (internal) human judge
from the (external) impersonal Rule of Law reflects an ideological
reification? The problem is that reification masks a basic contradiction, a
version of which is the following. Remember that Hayek’s main purpose
was to justify a particularly bourgeois form of liberal autonomy. The
justification proceeds by distinguishing the capricious terrain of subjective
politics from a natural order premised on a freedom-enabling legal order. If
the very forms of legal analysis, however, are sourced in the individual will
of the judge and not in some impersonal, generalized object, this distinction
between capricious politics and impersonal rule dissolves. And once
dissolved, the contradiction surfaces between the need to service a
meaningful idea of human freedom and the need to maintain a meaningful
sense of political order. It is through a process of reification, in which we
fetishize “the Rule of Law” and thereby externalize it from the subjective
will of the jurist, that the contradiction between the demands of freedom
and order is concealed. In a similar vein, Nicos Poulantzas explained that
“ideology has the precise function of hiding the real contradictions and of
reconstituting on an imaginary level a relatively coherent discourse which
serves as the horizon of the agents’ experience.”244 This is exactly what is
happening when legal ideology projects a natural harmony between the
demands of individual freedom and coercive order.
Reification, however, only does so much. Yes, reification masks a
contradiction by alienating the argument from the jurist, but if we want to
conceal the contradiction and legitimate the illusion of harmony to boot, we
243. SLAVOJ ZIZEK, Introduction, inMAPPING IDEOLOGY 7 (1994) (“Herein lies one of the tasks of the
postmodern critique of ideology: to designate the elements within an existing social order which . . .
point towards the system’s antagonistic character, and thus ‘estrange’ is to the self-evidence of its
established identity.”).
244. See NICOS POULANTZAS, POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL CLASSES 207 (1973).
66
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol31/iss2/9
2021] Deep Cuts 501
need more.245 Legitimation refers to a process in which a dominant class
persuades a subordinated class to give its consent to a systemic form of
subordination. Ideology is therefore more than a means for masking social
contradictions, but also a condition for the functioning and reproduction of
the system of class domination.246 The means of persuasion involve a
process of ideological enlargement, whereby the specific material interests
of a dominant class expand into political, intellectual, moral, and spiritual
interests.247 That is, subordinated classes eventually consent to a social
position of domination because they believe that what they are consenting
to is not domination at all, but rather an intellectually superior and morally
desirable system of ideas and practices. As Claude Lefort suggested in this
regard, “[t]he text of bourgeois ideology is written in capital letters:
Humanity, Progress, Science, Property, the Family.”248 In this development
of a common consensus about society’s most basic and legitimate
arrangements, the dominant class achieves hegemony over the subordinated
classes. What may have at a prior moment appeared as the contingent
interests of a very particular class, now transforms into an articulation of
universal ideals designed for the common good. This is the masquerade of
the universal, and the meaning behind the well-known remark attributed to
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, that whoever argues in the name of humanity is a
cheat.249
It is true that in this passageway between legitimation and hegemony that
the subordinated classes consent to a system that subordinates them, but at
least in the work of theorists like Antonio Gramsci, this consent is no form
of false consciousness. The subordinated classes do not legitimate the
hegemon because they are mistaken about the actual world in which they
live. They understand it just fine. The critical edge of a legitimating
hegemony is precisely that the subordinated understand that they are
subordinated, and yet they abide by and even promote the pedagogy of the
social frame anyway. Ideology, for thinkers in this Gramscian tradition, is
no chimerical form of upside-down thinking. As Chantal Mouffe explained,
“ideology has a material existence and that far from consisting in an
245. Jorge Lorrain writes that “[a]s the conditions under which productive practice is carried out are
always the conditions of the rule of a definite class, the ideological hiding of contradictions necessarily
serves the interests of that class.” JORGE LORRAIN, THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY 47 (1979). See also
Zizek, SUBLIME, supra note 235, at 8 (“We are in ideological space proper the moment this content . . .
is functional with regard to some relation of social domination (‘power’, ‘exploitation’) in an inherently
non-transparent way: the very logic of legitimating the relation of domination must remain concealed if
it is to be effective.”).
246. It plays this role by hiding the true relations between the classes, where social relations appear
“harmonious.” See ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 255 (Richard Howard & Annette Lavers, trans.,
2013); LORRAIN, supra note 245, at 47.
247. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (1971).
248. CLAUDE LEFORT, THE POLITICAL FORMS OF MODERN SOCIETY: BUREAUCRACY, DEMOCRACY,
TOTALITARIANISM (1986); JOHN THOMPSON, STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 27 (1984).
249. JACQUES DERRIDA, THE BEAST AND THE SOVEREIGN, VOL. 1, 72 (2009).
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ensemble of spiritual realities, it is always materialized in practices.”250
A distinct but related feature of a universalizing legitimation is the
strategy of naturalization.251 This is an ideological strategy that once again
begins with a central contradiction or divide, such as the divide Hayek
strikes between a natural domain of customary norms and the positive
sphere of arbitrary legislation and regulation. If our goal is to justify some
particular set of norms, such as property and contract, we can naturalize
those norms by what is often called mimesis: the process in which a
common law court or a legislature reflects or imitates the natural-historical.
That is, if we can successfully persuade that some positive rule or argument
mirrors the rule or argument that we could discover in something like a
“state of nature,” we have “naturalized” that rule or argument. Naturalizing
a rule of argument, however, does much more than give the agent a claim
for good origins—origins, it ought to be said, which can never be verified
given their location in “time immemorial.” More powerfully, naturalization
produces what Roberto Unger calls the “dictatorship of no alternatives.”252
A dictatorship of no alternatives is a dictatorship in which the powers of
institutional imagination are reduced and the ability to see beyond the frame
of our present arrangements is darkened. We become not only accustomed
to the notion that social inequality is normal, but that social inequality can
only be transformed in the most evolutionary of ways. In the light of a
naturalizing ideology, our faith is always in the hope that History or the
Market or some other “natural” force might bring the change we desire. Our
faith is never in ourselves. Eagleton summarizes the naturalizing strategy:
Social reality is redefined by the ideology to become co-extensive with
itself, in a way which occludes the truth that the reality in fact
generated the ideology. Instead, the two appear to be spontaneously
bred together, as indissociable as a sleeve and its lining. The result,
politically speaking, is an apparently vicious circle: the ideology could
only be transformed if the reality was such as to allow it to become
objectified; but the ideology processes the reality in ways which
forestall this possibility. The two are thus mutually self-confirming.
On this view, a ruling ideology does not so much combat alternative
ideas as thrust them beyond the very bounds of the thinkable.253
In the Fourth Critique, the passage from reification to legitimation and its
attendant strategies returns us to Kennedy’s conception of the structure of
legal consciousness.254 Following the Saussurean tradition, Kennedy posits
250. Chantal Mouffe, “Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci,” in GRAMSCI AND MARXIST THEORY 186
(Chantal Mouffe, ed., 1979).
251. See DESAUTELS-STEIN, supra note 17, at 262-291; ROBERTO UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-
NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY, Vol. 1 (2004).
252. ROBERTO UNGER, THE LEFT ALTERNATIVE 1 (2009).
253. EAGLETON, supra note 128, at 58.
254. Kennedy describes in detail how the CLS mode of ideology-critique differs from the Marxist socio-
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that the essential logic of legal consciousness—or what after Lacan and
Althusser might call the legal unconscious—comes from the fact that it is
structured as a language-system. In this semiotic context, a jurist operates
in a structure of legal thought. The structure of legal thought, in turn, is
assembled in terms of a basic tension that governs the forms of legal
argument. These forms fill out a lexicon of available moves. That basic
tension functions as the “langue” of the structure, or its governing grammar.
The indeterminate space of the lexicon, on the other hand, is “parole,” the
particular speech acts, utterances, claims, and decisions. It was this
structural relation between “langue” and “parole” that founded the early
CLS understanding of a jurist’s legal consciousness; it was also this
structural relation that was the site of ideology: reification-legitimation-
naturalization. As Kennedy explained,
this [mode of structural critique of doctrine and judicial reasoning] was
easy to understand as left analysis. On the model of traditional
ideology-critique, determination by law’s autonomous or by
democratic legislative will—or the derivation of law from a few
universally accepted ideals or natural rights—is revealed as
mystification. Determination by something at once more human and
less savory is revealed. And there is an explicit or implicit appeal to
‘people’ to take advantage of this revelation of freedom and oppression
to change things for the better.255
As we have seen in the first three Critiques, the cure for ideology is a turn
to “the real,” even if the “real” is too complicated for an empirical
assessment of what is truly happening. Ideology, in these senses, is a dense
fog, and social science a bracing wind. Thus, we might similarly expect the
Fourth Critique to investigate the political foundations of the legal structure,
the empirically verified social determinants. This, however, is the move
more appropriately associated with the socio-legal critique canvassed
above, even in its postructuralist variations. In the legal structuralist
critique, the question of how or whether the legal structure is empirically
connected with an “external” or “outside” is largely abandoned, for there
simply is no “scientific alternative to life as an ideologist.”256
A good illustration of where this line of argument ended up leading some
legal structuralists—and the sharp contrast it created between them and the
socio-legal studies tradition—could be seen, for example, in Janet Halley’s
Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism257 or Pierre
Schlag’s Laying Down the Law.258 The overarching picture of scholarly
legal mode in his A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, supra note 36, at 290-296.
255. Id. at 285.
256. Id. at 288-291. See also Alan Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.
J. 1229 (1981).
257. See HALLEY, supra note 43.
258. See PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERICAN
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(and lawyerly) agency that emerges from Halley’s discussion of the legal-
feminist tradition, and Schlag’s discussion of the process of legal reasoning
more generally, not only stands miles apart from Hunt’s and Silbey’s
appeals to the authority and theoretical promises of social sciences or
Marxist dialectical analysis. It also channels the Derridean il n’y a pas de
hors-texte argument in the most uncompromising fashion possible. There is
no way, Halley notes, that anyone pursuing a legal feminist project could
do so without immediately getting caught up in a whole architecture of pre-
existing ideological structures, since outside these ideological structures the
project of legal feminism is simply unintelligible. The only solution, if one
is not especially enthused by this fact, would be to walk away from the
project of legal feminism altogether—to lay it down, as Schlag puts it. This
is to quit the game, to take a break from it. There is something to be said,
after all, for the possibility that any “continued participation in the practice
of normative justification”—a practice which legal scholars inevitably
engage in, if only by virtue of practicing their craft—will, in the end, “have
the effect of reinforcing the legitimacy of the [very] system” one is fighting
against. So why not, as Jack Schlegel has asked, “simply fold up [the] tent
and steal into the night”?259
A good Foucauldian, of course, would note that on some meta level, we
cannot take a break, or walk away, or any such thing. Quitting the game is
still playing the game, just by other means. After all, getting some of the
players to quit at a certain time is precisely how some games are supposed
to be played. The abstract academic subjects that take the decision to “lay
down the law” or to “take a break” from this or that form of legal politics
may experience the moment of this decision as a form of personal self-
determination. But even by exercising this kind of self-determination they
only reinforce the effectivity of that broader ideological formation which
had interpellated them into precisely that (and not some other) kind of
rebellious subject position. As we have seen, one may quit a particular
strand of the ideological superstructure, but one cannot quit all ideology tout
court.
And yet at the same time that the Fourth Critique decisively abandoned
the classical liberal project of moving beyond ideology, it retained, however
unselfconsciously, another classical liberal assumption: the distinction
between the discursive project of the “internal critique” of legal reasoning
and doctrine and the “external” socio-economic reality in which law played
an “important” role. Similarly, while the CLS critique abandoned the effort
to empirically verify the legal structure’s existence in the social world, this
did not mean that as an analytical category “the real” was jettisoned
LEGAL MIND (1996).
259. John Henry Schlegel, But Pierre, If We Can’t Think Normatively, What Are We to Do?, 57 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 955, 958-9 (2003).
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altogether. For as Kennedy explained, “[t]he internal structures of the
models and their sequencing were asserted to be good descriptions of the
reality of textual structure.”260 Furthermore, noting the ideological
dimensions of legal reasoning did not suggest a turn to “judicial ideology,”
as demanded by the empirico-legal scholars. Rather, “liberalism and
conservativism, understood as discursive systems, as ideologies, are inside
rather than outside legal discourse itself; legal and political versions of
liberalism and conservatism are mutually constitutive.”261 Additionally,
Kennedy argued,
although ‘outside’ factors influence adjudication, they do not impose
on it an outside ‘logic.’ The first reason for this is, as just stated, that
they do not determine the rules judges make, in any ordinary sense of
the word ‘determine.’ The second reason is . . . that neither the
economic base nor patriarchy nor racial supremacy has any more
internal coherence, any more ‘logic,’ than the process of legal
reasoning from the extant materials.262
As we have suggested, the target of ideology in this Fourth Critique is not
the grand and totalizing target attacked by the functionalists, nor is it the
reduced and personal political outlook measured by the ELS scholars. And
while there are many intellectual linkages with the socio-legal scholars, the
legal structuralist critique targets an ideology of legal consciousness in a
very different way from that pursued in the socio-legal evaluation of
“everyday” legal practices. The target in the legal structuralist mode of
ideology-critique is something much closer to the Althusserian idea of
significational unconscious: the structure of the legal argument, and, in
particular, the contradictory grammar of legal reasoning, the largely
indeterminate lexicon of operative legal categories, and the combination of
strategies for navigating the relations between the two.
C. A Law School Hypo
Briefly, and to help envision the practical effect of this type of ideology-
critique, imagine a student entering law school with a typically center-left
ambition for social justice. Like so many of her classmates, she hopes to
fight inequality with an education in and eventual mastery over the legal
system. If the three years of law school are successful by the school’s
standards, she will retain every bit of her initial ambition for social justice.
With luck, she will feel even more empowered than when she began. And
how has this empowerment transpired? Has it taken place through a greater
familiarity with the rules of law? The rules of property, tort, contract, the
260. KENNEDY, supra note 36, at 286.
261. Id. at 289.
262. Id.
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constitution, and so much else? No doubt, at the end of her legal education
the student will have a working knowledge of legal rules that she did not
have at the start. But it isn’t a familiarity with the rules of law that are the
source of her empowerment—or at least, they aren’t the greater source.
What is empowering is her indoctrination into a view or understanding of
the rule of law, even if she doesn’t know it. If it was merely the rules of law
that might do the trick, law schools would best turn themselves into
extended bar review courses (which, of course, many believe to be the right
direction). If we understand law schools as sites of empowerment, an
encounter with bare rules simply will not do, for it is the broader sense in
which we encounter the rules that is critical for a legal pedagogy to succeed.
To train a student in a kind of thinking about the rule of law is to immerse
that student in an ideological world of its own. The law school is a space
for a very specific training that lionizes a practice of argument and
champions a vision of the proper relation between law and politics. Of
course, it’s just wrong to suggest that the rules of law are irrelevant to this
ideological process of reification and legitimation, because they surely do
have a part to play. But in the structure of legal thought—the structure of
legal argument—we might say that the rules of law taught in law school
courses constitute the substance of law’s lexical foreground. The rules of
law are those conscious, rationalized pieces of the language that we
regularly encounter on the surface, combining in various ways as the
situation and the jurist suggest. In contrast, it is the techniques of legal
reasoning, the practices of legal argument, the grammatical patterns
governing the lexicon—an understanding of what to do with the rules and
how to distinguish “recognizable” forms of reasoning from “activist” or
“ideological” claims to power—that constitutes a vision of the rule of law
as background ideology, the ideology of the code itself.
As our social-justice-oriented law student swims in the legal structure’s
background ideology, she increasingly comes to identify both her normative
directives and the boundaries within which her projects for social justice
ought to take place. These directives and boundaries emerge primarily as
the artifacts of formalist ideology, mixed together with post-realist
ideology. In terms of these formalist artifacts, she has likely accepted
Hayek’s ideological division between the jurist on the one side and the
jurist’s modes of reasoning on the other. This is the reification of law itself,
alienating the means of argumentative production from the human jurist.
The manifestation of alienation is most striking when law school graduates
repeatedly proclaim the judge as umpire, calling balls and strikes. It is no
less pronounced, however, among even those more “realistic” jurists who
concede to the discretionary nature of adjudication, but nevertheless fret
about the intrusions of judicial activism.
As a result of this quotidian type of law school reification, in which the
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person of the jurist and the jurist’s work have been pulled apart, our law
student’s impulse for social justice is typically channeled into two sorts of
direction. The first is rule reform. After all, as the argumentative means of
production slide into the background, it is the domain of doctrine that comes
forward—the true and proper source of social inequality and, therefore, the
proper target for change. Change the rule, you will change society. There is
a double-division at work here. On the one side, there is the division
between jurist and the jurist’s means of argumentative production. On the
other side, there is a division between the rules of law and the practices of
argument. Pushed into the foreground are the jurist on the one side and the
rule of law on the other. Both divisions unite in their joint suppression of
argumentative production as a semiotic (and ideological) structure. As the
rules of law push into the foreground, everything else ends up externalized
from law and packaged in what comes to be called “judicial ideology.” And
as unsavory as a judicial ideology is, there isn’t really much of anything the
law graduate can do about it. It is “natural” that jurists will have opinions
that infect their proper adjudications, and, while it is unfortunate, “judicial
ideology” isn’t a target for social justice. This is just the “way that it is, and
the way it has very likely always been.”
We can already see much of what the first two Critiques have traditionally
targeted for the good works of empirical legal science. With the law
student’s focus on rules, she tends to ignore the important social contexts in
which these rules take shape. She has failed to see how law’s life isn’t logic,
but lived experience, social function, real purpose. Functionalism therefore
counsels a second direction for social justice and legal change. In addition
to work on rule reform (recall this is where the student began), our law
student should come to see how social justice might best be served through
changes to the political and social contexts which generate law’s rules in
the first place. That is, whereas formalism guides the student to the black
letter rules, functionalism directs the student away from the law altogether,
and into the socio-political world which is law’s a priori. In either case,
however, this entire process of estranging the practices of argument from
the jurist and the rules of law, and then enfolding those practices into the
black box of judicial ideology, legitimates a vision of the proper avenue for
social justice. Working for justice, in the light of this legal ideology, either
means making the rules of law more just, or making politics more just. What
has been pushed off the table altogether, is the idea that social justice might
target the very practices of legal argument—the domain of legal thought, or
the legal unconscious. From the perspective of formalism, functionalism, or
empirical legal studies, these “structures” are just “philosophy” or
“random” or, as the political scientists suggest, plain old nonsense.
We might ask why it is that the first two Critiques dominate this ideology
of empowerment, and why the postmodern version of socio-legal studies,
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much less that of legal structuralism, are relatively alien. There is much to
say here, with respect to the way in which poststructuralism and a
reactionary retro-liberalism together helped push legal structuralism out of
the scene. And then, the way in which American pragmatism engulfed the
whole thing.263 But what seems clear enough is this: Law schools are
efficient in the training of jurists as agents of ideology-critique. Law
students see ideology in the rules themselves, and seek their reform. Law
students see ideology in the singular focus on rules, and seek legal change
by closing the distance between law and politics. Law students see ideology
in the separation between judicial decision-making and legal doctrine, and
seek to measure and expose ideological influence by widening the distance
between law and politics. What is less visible is the sense of legal ideology
made manifest in the Third and Fourth Critiques. What is the ideology of
law as an everyday practice? What is the ideology of law as a structure of
legal argument? The answer from the law school: We don’t really know,
and we don’t actually care. We are pragmatists, after all.
CONCLUSION
This Article anticipates a number of questions about which we have said
next to nothing. How, for example, has the sedimentation of the Four
Critiques blocked our collective abilities to see beyond them, if indeed there
is anything to see? How have the Critiques contributed to our current sense
of overwhelming crisis, if they have at all? What might the critique of legal
ideology become? Rather than offer some answers, which we concede
would certainly have been more satisfying, we have instead tried to
elaborate a common platform from which such answers might become more
intelligible. If we want to know what the critique of legal ideology might
become, we need to know first what the critique of legal ideology has been.
We need to know something of the overall structure of the history of
ideology-critique in the legal context.
And what has it been? The Four Critiques of legal functionalism,
empirical legal studies, socio-legal studies, and legal structuralism, are
premised on a series of analytical differences, each of which operates as a
variable. We have summarized these differences in the appendix below. The
first and the most important of these is a Critique’s ontological model for
“ideology.” How does a Critique position the importance and value for
understanding legal ideology? What dangers does ideology pose to legal
practice, legal scholarship, legal analysis, etc.? Each of the Four Critiques
has its own range of answers to these questions. On the whole, however,
and now looking forward to the next step in our critical program, it might
be helpful to coalesce the ontologies of the Four Critiques into two.
263. DESAUTELS-STEIN, supra note 17, at 197-298.
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The Third and Fourth Critiques belonging to socio-legal studies and legal
structuralism draw much of their inspiration from distinctly non-liberal
sources: traces of Foucauldian thought, quite a bit of Bourdieusian
sociology, deconstruction, various shades of Marxism, second-wave
feminism, various spins on Saussure, and phenomenology.
Correspondingly, these Critiques construe ideology not just as a set of
distorting ideas and conceptual frameworks, but as fields of practices,
material relations, and semiotic structures. Inasmuch as ideology thus
became something that was lived and exercised by the different segments
of the legal community or something that predicated the basic intelligibility
of legal practice and legal thought, the whole idea of “freeing” law from
ideology inevitably becomes, more or less, the wrong way to think about
the problem. In contrast, the first two Critiques belonging to legal
functionalism and empirical legal studies each operate from a simpler
conception of ideology—one that resonates with the way this term is
typically used in the classical liberal tradition and that essentially portrays
ideology as distortion. These Critiques sustain a certain belief in the idea of
good “legal science” (as opposed to the “bad” science of legal formalism),
that is to say, the possibility of “freeing” the enterprise of legal scholarship
from the lies of legal ideology. Each of the first two Critiques are
fundamentally motivated by a desire to get at what is “really going on.”
Realism is their foundation.
This “realist” approach to legal ideology, with its history in legal
functionalism and empirical legal studies, has almost entirely lost its edge.
And in losing its edge, it has achieved a kind of status quo dominance.
Indeed, it is the rise and influence of movements like empirical legal studies
and, more specifically, law and economics, that has helped motivate the
counter-movement of a group of scholars operating under the moniker of
LPE (Law and Political Economy). As we conclude this essay, it is worth
dwelling on LPE for a moment, both for what it ostensibly offers as an
antidote to the contemporary power of the realist view of legal ideology,
and what it does not.
As explained in a recent article attempting to provide LPE with a mission
statement,264 the authors criticize legal education for its maintenance of a
pedagogical “conversation shaped by the depoliticization and naturalization
of market-mediated inequalities.”265 The explanatory motor for this is what
they call the “Twentieth Century Synthesis,” which appears to be a
dialectical rebranding of the classic liberal public-private distinction
targeted a hundred years ago by the realists and functionalists.266 On the one
264. Jedediah Britton-Purdy et al., Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the
Twentieth Century Synthesis, 129 YALE. L.J. 1784 (2020).
265. Id. at 1790.
266. Although, as far as we can tell, the “synthesis” here is not meant in a dialectical sense.
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side of this “synthesis” are the private law fields, areas of law generally
thought to be “about the market.”267 In these areas, such as property,
contract, intellectual property, antitrust, and the like, law and economics
predominates as the operative mindset for thinking about rules, and how to
best reform the rules. Questions about “distribution, power, and
democracy,” are sidelined in favor of efficient wealth maximization. On the
other side are the public law fields, but “centrally constitutional law.”268 In
this public law domain, the authors suggest, it isn’t that law and economics
directly holds the field so much as “key liberal values” like “freedom,
equality, and state neutrality” have become increasingly diminished.269
Freedom comes to mean individual participation in the marketplace of ideas
(and commerce), equality comes to mean whatever economic inequality
isn’t, and governmental intervention comes to mean capture by interest
groups.270 In this public and “political” space, “economic power [is] hard to
find and correct.”271 The “synthesis” here lies in the general acceptance that
this neoliberal version of the public-private distinction is “just the way it
is.”
The LPE authors argue that this neoliberal vision is a distortion, and that
in reality, this isn’t the way it is at all. Indeed, this presentation of an
apolitical and economic side of law, coupled with a political but
marginalized side of law, is due for a reality check. The fulcrum for change,
they explain, is a return to legal realism. The authors rightly point to the
functionalist mindset that arose in the wake of legal realism, as we discussed
above in the context of the First Critique. The authors also rightly explain
how law and economics scholars are among the many heirs to the
functionalist tradition272—and indeed, while we said only a little about the
emergence of law and economics, it is worth noting again the strong
connections between law and economics and empirical legal studies. What
went wrong, according to the LPE narrative, is that in the transition from
functionalism to law and economics, what was lost was “the concern with
economic life’s character as a site of struggle amid unequal power. It gave
up the urgency of both criticizing coercion and inequality and asking how
they might be justified, if at all.”273 From antitrust to intellectual property to
environmental law to corporate law and even to civil procedure, the effect
of the law and economics movement has been the valorization of rules
focused on the elimination of externalities, transaction costs, and market
failures, and the prioritization of allocative efficiency. And while these rules
267. Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 264.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1806.
270. Id. at 1807.
271. Id. at 1794.
272. Id. at 1796.
273. Id.
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are so often seen as neutral, and just “good science,” the authors argue that
they rather express a “particular view of power and legitimacy, one that
viewed market ordering as tending to diffuse and neutralize power and as
earning legitimacy by producing both a wealthy society and an
appropriately constrained state.”274 The problem, from this perspective, is
neither realism nor functionalism. The problem is the way in which these
ideas were steadily domesticated.
The answer from LPE scholars is a return to a baseline running through
the first two Critiques, and more marginally, through the Third Critique as
well: the legal realist critique of the public-private distinction. From the
functionalist critique of a Hayekian formalism, to the ELS critique of
political ideology, to the socio-legal critique of mutual causation and
everyday practice, twentieth-century ideology-critique has always been
concerned with the way in which the political hides in its ostensibly
apolitical domains. Indeed, and as evident in the work of the Fourth
Critique, arguments asserting the autonomy of the market from law are
prime targets for ideology-critique, since the market is a legal concept.275
Indeed, as the authors rightly point out, “this reorientation would inquire
into how law creates, reproduces, and projects political-economic power,
for whom, and with what results.”276 The result is a path back to legal
realism and the critique of rules.277 Or, if not addition to rule reform, the
path is away from law and to the intersections of political and market
power.278
The LPE authors do say that in addition to rule reform and attention to
forms of political power operating “outside” the legal domain,279 it is
important to take a structural or systemic approach to the relation between
law and political economy. This means “a shift in our view of inclusion
from the individual to the structural level, looking not just at individualized
experience but rather at how law and policy construct systematic forms of
hierarchy and domination through a market that is always embedded in
social relations. This is one of the key insights of critical legal thought and
literature from both feminists and scholars of critical race theory.”280
While this view of structure is rather popular today, don’t mistake it for
the sort of structuralism grounding the Fourth Critique—it is best
understood as a return to functionalism. It is a nostalgic look back to the
embeddedness of law and politics in social context, the postwar welfare
274. Id. at 1806.
275. Justin Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 387 (2012).
276. Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 264, at 1820.
277. Id. at 1821.
278. Id. at 1822.
279. Id. at 1815. Of course, the authors are keen to suggest a mutually causal role here, in the fashion of
the Third Critique.
280. Id. at 1823.
75
Desautels-Stein and Rasulov: Deep Cuts: Four Critiques of Legal Ideology
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository,
512 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 31:2
state and social democracy, and indeed, the authors explicitly concede the
provenance.281 Following Hale, they encourage skepticism about a
separation between a public field of coercion and a private field of
consensual bargaining.282 Next, and after blurring that classic liberal (and
neoliberal) distinction, we should ask whether and how law creates systems
and hierarchies of privilege which intersect with the ways in which society
classifies people into particular identities. “An approach that puts inequality
at the center would need to ask how ‘status’—meaning the differentiation
of citizens according to categories—persists and is reproduced in the age of
contract.”283 This “structural” approach, with its sensitivities to the mutually
constitutive roles of law and politics (and here we see nods in the direction
of the Third Critique), would require an empirical analysis that might yield
a “rough matrix on which to consider the distributional consequences of
law.”284 And just as importantly, the authors explain, reform necessitates a
transformation of our political institutions and sensibilities, from greater
commitments to voting rights and the elimination of the electoral college to
the strengthening of labor unions and the media infrastructure.285
At the end of their essay, the authors conclude that if the LPE approach
is going to succeed, it will have to go “beyond mere critique.”286 In a sense,
this concluding sentiment is both curious and unsurprising. It is curious
because one would think that, having spent so many pages attempting to
criticize the dominance of law and economics, the authors wouldn’t really
regard the critique as “merely” anything. Critique is essential, isn’t it? Well,
maybe not, and this is why this conclusion is also not that surprising after
all. What is the nature of that critique which LPE actually offers of the
“Twentieth Century Synthesis”? How far does it move beyond the terrain
of the ideology-critique developed by legal functionalists and empiricists?
Is it just more of the same, only “better”?
The problem is not only that in its lesser manifestations the LPE program
offers a certain degree of sanctioned ignorance vis-a-vis the lessons and
legacies of post-realist legal scholarship, especially those parts of it that
were not produced “from the right.” Its advocacy for restoring a progressive
legal project—a project that we share much enthusiasm for—is premised
upon an understanding of the legal form and of that form’s broader
relationship with society that at best merely mirrors critical projects that are
now a hundred years old. What is more, in its neglect of the general analysis
of law’s functional indeterminacy (an idea developed in the Third Critique)
and the structuring effects of legal consciousness (an idea developed in the
281. Id. at 1824.
282. Id. at 1825.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1826.
285. Id. at 1829-1830.
286. Id. at 1834.
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Fourth), the LPE project runs the risk of rolling back the clock in a way that
would startle even some of the more apolitically centrist realists (like, for
example, the Llewellyn of the “canons on statutes” period). And lest the
mere fact of LPE’s showing readiness to resume the use of categories like
“distribution” and “political economy” in its discourse blinds us to the
persistent triviality of the actual insights it generates under these rubrics,
one may be well-advised to recall that an obsessive fetishization of abstract
disembodied ideas—be it “logical rigour,” “efficiency,” or
“distribution”287—far more often than not is, in fact, a sign precisely of that
kind of formalist sensibility that so worried the likes of Cohen and Ehrlich.
We mentioned above that the Four Critiques seem to reduce to two
ontologies. The Critiques belonging to legal functionalism and empirical
legal studies compulsively orbit around the notion of “realism” as the cure
for ideology. As things stand, it is difficult to see how the LPE project, at
least in its present configuration, will be able to offer a radically different
theoretical program, which raises inevitably the question of how far in
contemporary Anglo-American legal discourse the trope of “returning to
realism” may itself have become a rhetorical device deployed in the service
of legal ideology. Characteristically, as we saw earlier, neither the Third nor
the Fourth Critiques in this context would usually fail to signal their
principled preference for a decidedly “antirealist” theoretical outlook. In the
Third Critique, the assumption of an antirealist orientation, in the form of
dialectical thought, is commonly assumed to be an integral element of any
critical practice. In the Fourth Critique, antirealism in the form of
phenomenology constitutes an indispensable precondition of the very
possibility of critical inquiry. A curious pattern, to be sure, but if, as this
argument seems to imply, realism as an engine of ideology-critique has
somehow been transformed over time into a vehicle of ideology production,
what reason is there to think that antirealism in both its dialectical and
phenomenological configurations is not going to do the same or that,
indeed, it has not already done so? Our postmodern sensibilities counsel
that to ignore this possibility is at the very least unwise. But what is then
the solution? Which way should we turn?
Whatever the answer to that may be, our instinct at this preliminary stage
is to say that what should come next must be a reawakening of our collective
interest in the critique of legal ideology. After all, consider the present
moment. On the one hand, the specter of crisis seems everywhere
triumphant. And on the other, the loudest voices about ideology in law
belong to those who offer its most restricted conceptions. Ironically, it is
this heir to the “End of Ideology” program that has arisen as the North Star
for those concerned about the political capture and distortion of the
287 Paulo Barrozo, Critical Legal Thought: The Case for a Jurisprudence of Distribution, 92 U. COLO.
L. REV. _ (2021).
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judiciary. And at the same time, the techniques and tools of Marxism,
structuralism, and poststructuralism have fallen right off the map. This
combination of events, in which the foundational elements of critical theory
have taken second place to End of Ideology realism on the one side while
on the other crises of the mind are ascendant, makes us wonder.
Is the right way to think about the problem through a resurrection of the
Third and Fourth Critiques, a redeployment in the age of Trump, Covid, and
the “existential dilemmas” of social media? As we said at the start, nostalgia
isn’t the key. Rather, what we hope to see on the horizon is a transformation
of the broader genre of ideology-critique—a transformation that makes
good on the promise of critical theory, but not the promise of a Marx,
Saussure, Foucault, or Derrida. A promise we haven’t made yet, but a
promise—we hope—coming soon. If we return to the questions with which
this Article began, and ask of the crises that afflict both society and our very
ability to criticize, we suggested that a deep look at the ideology of law was
the starting point. Why? Here we betray our own partisanship in the very
building of this map. Our intuition is that, if we are to know what the critique
of legal ideology might become, we must first know what it has been. This
intuition, of course, is a staple in the structuralist ethos.
That said, we also remain aware of the challenges that afflict the critical
legal project, or at the very least that form of it which we described under
the rubric of the Fourth Critique. Not only does the CLS tradition seem to
have failed to move beyond the unhelpful binarism of the internal/external
distinction, its broader theoretical enterprise also appears inchoate. Some of
it, undoubtedly, is a product of institutional politics: no scholarly movement
in the history of Anglo-American legal thought has come under as vicious
and sustained an attack at its politico-economic and institutional base as
critical legal studies. But there was something else there too. Well before
its version of structuralist semiotics had exhausted its analytical potential,
the CLS tradition began to slide down the slippery slope of poststructuralist
disenchantment. Just what the project of legal ideology-critique based
around a legal structuralist sensibility might have become, had it entered a
fruitful phase of combination with critical race theory, feminism, and
postcolonial studies, remains an open question.
If the Four Critiques have all hit different dead-ends, and if these dead-
ends work to both mystify and radicalize the “hermeneutic of suspicion”
that governs our contemporary conjuncture, how can the power of critique
be reclaimed? Is there a fifth tradition of ideology-critique? A sixth or a
seventh? Let us hope so.
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APPENDIX: FOUR CRITIQUES OF LEGAL IDEOLOGY
Functionalism Empirical Legal Studies Postmodern Socio-
Legal Studies
Legal Structuralism
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